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1VOLUNTARINESS WITH A VENGEANCE1: 
Miranda and a Modern Alternative
Just as the law does not require that a defendant receive a perfect trial, only a fa ir  one. it 
cannot realistically require that policemen investigating serious crimes make no errors 
whatsoever. The pressures o f  law enforcement and the vagaries o f human nature would 
make such an expectation unrealistic. Before we penalize police error, therefore, we must 
consider whether the sanction serves a valid and useful purpose:
INTRODUCTION
One of the most famous opinions in American jurisprudence is that o f the United 
States Supreme Court in the case of Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The 
Court’s prophylactic rule in Miranda has been followed in both state and federal courts 
with little derogation for over thirty years. On February 8, 1999, in Dickerson v. United 
States. 166 F.3d 667, the United States Court o f Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ignored 
Miranda, turning instead to 18 U.S.C. § 3501, a relatively obscure federal statute enacted 
in 1968 in response to the Court’s decision in Miranda. The United State Supreme Court
1 Miranda v. Arizona 384 U.S. 436, 505 (1966)(Harlan, J., dissenting).
2granted certiorari and heard oral arguments early in the summer of last year and on June 
26, 2000, the Court reversed the opinion of the Fourth Circuit in Dickerson and 
reaffirmed Miranda and its progeny.3 There were many who felt the need for Miranda 
had passed; indeed, Congress enacted a legislative replacement just a few years after 
Miranda, and even today educators and politicians continue to criticize the opinion.
The discussion in Dickerson focused on whether Miranda was a constitutional 
rule and thus, whether § 3501 of the United States Code was a proper exercise of 
Congress’ power. Had that argument been successful, § 3501 would have been validated 
and Miranda would have faded into quiet disuetude. But the argument failed. The 
Supreme Court rejcted § 3501 and reaffirmed Miranda and preserved all of its 
exceptions; exceptions created by the Court itself.
Thus Miranda is still the law today, despite its steady erosion by the judiciary 
over the decades and despite the early attempt by Congress to legislate an alternative. 
With the opinion in Dickerson, the Court has made it quite clear that Miranda will linger 
into the uncertain future. Acknowledging Miranda’s survival, this thesis will explore the 
relevant facts and opinions in some detail then submit an alternative to the unpleasant 
result reached when a defendant’s voluntary confession is suppressed due to a technical 
violation o f the Court’s famous rule.
2 Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 433, 446 (1974).
3 Dickerson v. United States. 120 S.Ct. 2326 (2000).
3CHAPTER ONE
A. FACTS OF MIRANDA V. ARIZONA4
Near midnight on March 2nd , 1963, an eighteen year old girl named Sandra Smith 
was walking home down an unlit street in Phoenix, Arizona. She had taken the bus home 
from work and had just been dropped off at her stop. While she was walking, a car 
approached and stopped in front of her path. A man emerged from the vehicle and 
grabbed her. He pressed a sharp object against her throat and told her not to scream. He 
opened the back door and ordered her to get in and lie down. He bound her wrists and 
ankles with rope and drove her to a desolate part o f the city. He raped her, then ordered 
her to get dressed and returned her to the area where she was abducted. He robbed her of 
the four dollars she had in her purse, then asked her to “pray for him.” After he left, 
Sandra ran to her sister’s home and her sister called the Phoenix Police Department.
Sandra was brought to the hospital for an examination. Responding officers 
turned her case over to Detective Carroll F. Cooley, a five-year veteran police officer. 
The detective interviewed Sandra, who described her attacker as “a Mexican or possibly 
Italian, with dark, curly hair, combed back, about 25 or so, average height and build, 
wearing a white T-shirt and blue jeans.” She described the car as “an old four-door sedan, 
light green, with a piece o f rope across the back of the front seat.” She added that “the
4 Taken from the first hand account o f  former-Phoenix police Captain Carroll F. Cooley, the detective who 
interrogated Ernie Miranda. His account was reprinted verbatim in “The Statute That Time Forgot," Paul 
G. Cassell, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 175(1999) and summarized here with Mr. Cassell’s «press permission.
4upholstery was a light beige with vertical stripes; there were paint brushes on the floor” 
and she “remembered smelling turpentine.”
After a week Sandra returned to work. One of her relatives, Dave Henry, waited 
for her at the bus stop when she came home each night. Approximately one week after 
the rape, while Dave was waiting for her to get off the bus, he noticed a car cruising 
slowly through the area where Sandra was abducted and glanced at the license plate 
number. Later, after Sandra emerged from the bus and began walking with Dave, he saw 
the vehicle again. When he pointed the vehicle out to Sandra she commented that it 
looked like the same vehicle into which she was forced. They called the police and from 
the vehicle description and tag number Detective Cooley was able to determine that the 
vehicle belonged to Twila M. Hoffman.
Twila Hoffman was married to Ernie Miranda. The detectives checked the name 
"Ernest Miranda" and discovered the suspect had several arrests for assault with intent to 
commit rape, robbery and auto theft. Eventually the investigation led the detectives to 
Miranda’s address and when they arrived they noticed the suspect vehicle parked outside. 
The tag matched5, and so did Sandra’s description of the interior, including the rope 
found within.
When Miranda answered the door the detectives asked him to accompany them to 
the police station. At the station the detectives explained why they wanted to speak with 
him and Miranda denied any involvement. Miranda agreed to stand in a line-up. Sandra
5 Actually, Dave Henry mistook the last three numbers o f  the tag when he called the police, but correctly 
described the make and model o f  the vehicle. After further investigation the detectives matched the partial 
tag number to the vehicle as described by Mr. Henry.
5tentatively identified him but could not be sure. Another woman was summoned to the 
line-up but she was equally unsure.6 When the detectives returned to Miranda, he 
appeared nervous and asked if  he had been identified. When the detectives informed him 
that he indeed had been identified, his response was “well, I guess I'd better tell you 
about it then."7
Miranda proceeded to tell the detectives a story matching Sandra’s account of
what happened. He mentioned his statement to Sandra asking her to pray for him, and
8  described the sharp object used to abduct her. After describing his action in sufficient
detail to convince the detectives, he agreed to sign a written statement. On the statement
was typed the following:
I, [Miranda’s signature]. do hereby swear that I make this statement 
voluntarily and o f my own free will, with no threats, coercion, or promises of 
immunity, and with full knowledge of my legal rights, understanding any 
statement I make may be used against me.
I, [Miranda’s signature], am [23] years of age and have completed the [8th] 
grade in school.
After he signed the statement, Sandra was brought into the room where Miranda 
identified her as his victim. Sandra also identified him with certainty. Following this 
identification, the detectives formally arrested Miranda for kidnaping, rape and robbery.
Finally, Miranda was asked to write in longhand a statement explaining his 
actions, to which he agreed and wrote the following9:
6 This woman was abducted under similar circumstances in the same general area, and Miranda was later 
convicted o f  this attack as well. Arizona v. Miranda. 109 Ariz. 337, 509 P.2d 607 (1973).
7 The detectives did not inform Miranda that the identification was not made with strong conviction.
8 Miranda stated that it was a fingernail file.
9 “earn” are Miranda’s initials, indicating any mistakes o f  his and indicating the beginning and end o f  his 
statement.
6"eam. Picked eam. Seen a girl walking up street. Stopped a 
little ahead of her got out of car walked towards her 
grabbed her by the arm and asked to get in car. Got in car 
without force tied hands and ankles. Drove away for a few 
mile. Stopped asked to take clothes off. Did not, asked me 
to take her back home. 1 started to take clothes off her 
without any force and with cooperation. Asked her to lay 
down and she did. Could not get penis into vagina got 
about 1/2 (half) inch in. Told her to get clothes back on.
Drove her home. I couldn't say I was sorry for what 1 had 
done but asked her to pray for me. earn."
The statement was attached to a form, upon which was typed “I have read and understand 
the foregoing statement and hereby swear to its truthfulness.” The form was then signed 
by the defendant, Detective Cooley and a witness, Officer Wilfred M. Young. So ended 
Ernest A. Miranda’s written confession.
B. MIRANDA V. ARIZONA: THE TRIAL AND THE APPEALS
At trial, Miranda’s confession was admitted over objection, and upon conviction 
Miranda was sentenced to 20 years in prison. On appeal, the Arizona Supreme Court 
affirmed the conviction. The Court held that Miranda’s confession was voluntary and that 
because he did not request a lawyer he had no right to counsel. Miranda’s application for 
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court was granted, and in his appeal he argued 
that by eliciting his confession the detectives violated his right to counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment. The Supreme Court, however, focused on the Fifth Amendment in its 
opinion,10 and reversed Miranda’s conviction.11
10 As noted by Professor Cassell, the Appellant in Miranda did not even mention the Fifth Amendment in 
his brief to the Court, focusing only on the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments; however, the Court 
unilaterally focused on the Fifth Amendment in its opinion.
7C. POSITION OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT IN MIRANDA V. 
ARIZONA
It is clear that the Court in Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was 
concerned with the perceived abuses by law enforcement officers in their interrogation of 
suspects. Chief Justice Warren, in a majority opinion shared by four others, deplored the 
use o f the “third degree” and other physical or psychological means of coercion 
employed by the police to secure a confession. The opinion also cited a long list of 
studies and articles concerning the use of the “third degree.” The opinion then clarified 
that “the modem practice o f in-custody interrogation is psychologically rather than 
physically oriented.”12
While deploring the use of the “third degree,” the Court admitted that it had no 
actual knowledge of the conduct of an investigation and that the secrecy of the 
interrogation process itself “results in a gap in our knowledge as to what in fact goes on 
in the interrogation rooms.”13 The Court referred to the afore-mentioned studies and 
articles and also to “various police manuals and texts which document procedures 
employed with success in the past.”14 It is from these texts that the Court was able to 
describe what was referred to as the “third degree.” It is telling to list these eight practices 
before any further discussion:
11 The Supreme Court remanded for a new trial. Miranda was retried and convicted. Arizona v. Miranda. 
104 Ariz. 174, 450 P.2d 364 (1969).
12 Id  at 448.
13 Id.
8(1) Privacy: Being alone with the person under interrogation.
(2) Displaying “an air o f confidence in the suspect’s guilt.”
(3) Emotional appeals.
(4) Tricks. These tricks include placing the suspect in a staged line-up and 
having someone identify him, or the “Mutt and Jeff’ act, to be described 
under (7).
(5) “Dogged persistence.” This is qualified with the recognition that the 
investigator must tend to the suspect’s need for food, sleep and necessities.
(6) The offering o f legal excuses. This includes the investigator putting the 
facts of the crime in a different light to make the crime sound more 
justifiable and make it more likely that the suspect will admit the crime.
(7) The show of hostility. This is the “Mutt and Jeff’ routine. It is a 
scenario commonly seen employed by actors in the role o f investigators on 
television and consists of one investigator acting the part o f the angry and 
forceful accuser and his partner, apologetic and good-natured.
(8) This practice usually comes after the above steps have failed. Once the suspect 
has refused to speak or refuses to speak until he sees a member of his family or 
his attorney, the investigator is to “concede him the right to remain silent,” then 
explain that his refusal to speak only shadows him with an air o f guilt and that if 
he were innocent there should be no need for any o f this.15
There is then documented the long history of the law on confessions. That
confessions be voluntary has been an accepted part o f American constitutional
jurisprudence for some time.
In criminal trials, in the courts o f the United States, wherever a question arises 
whether a confession is incompetent because not voluntary, the issue is 
controlled by that portion of the [F]ifth amendment * * * commanding that 
no person 'shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against 
himself.'16
14 Id.
15 Id. at 449-52.
9This is not a concept peculiar to American jurisprudence. The Miranda Court recognized 
the maxim, “nemo tenetur seipsum accusare” 17, and acknowledged that the concept long 
predated the birth of our nation.18 The Court believed that “[t]he presence of an attorney, 
and the warnings delivered to the individual enable the defendant under otherwise 
compelling circumstances to tell his story without fear, effectively, and in a way that 
eliminates the evils in the interrogation process.”19 The evils are, presumably, the eight 
practices listed above.
Critics o f the Miranda opinion, beginning with Justice Clark himself in dissent, 
have argued that this privilege has been unduly extended beyond its original intent. “Until 
today, the role of the Constitution has been only to sift out undue pressure, not to assure
• 9ftspontaneous confessions.”
Even more telling is the fact that while the majority cites the Fifth Amendment as 
the source of and justification for the Miranda warnings, the arguments given are 
essentially couched in and dependent upon Sixth Amendment concepts, those same 
concepts which formed the basis of Miranda’s argument to the Supreme Court. The 
warnings that one has a right to counsel or if indigent, the appointment of counsel are two 
examples of such Sixth Amendment protections. Justice White, in his dissent to Miranda, 
went so far as to accuse the majority of “creat[ing] a limited Fifth Amendment right to
7 Icounsel.”
16 384 U.S. at 461 (citing Bram v. United States. 168 U.S. 532 ,542 (1897)).
17 “No-one is bound to accuse himself.”
18 Miranda. 384 U.S. at 442.
19 Id  at 466.
20 Id  at 515.
21 Id. at 537.
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Having established the history of confessions and the alleged abuses o f modem 
law enforcement in investigating crimes the Court prescribed its judicial remedy, namely, 
the following:
(1) “[A] person in custody ... must first be informed in clear and unequivocal 
terms that he has the right to remain silent.”
(2) “[A]nything said can and will be used against the individual in court.”
(3) “[T]he right to have counsel present at the interrogation . . . .  [and] also to 
have counsel present during any questioning if the defendant so desires.”
(4) “[I]t is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult with 
an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to 
represent him.”22
It seems beyond dispute that these warnings are not per se required by the Constitution.
[W]e cannot say that the Constitution necessarily requires adherence to any 
particular solution for the inherent compulsions of the interrogation process . .
. . Our decision in no way creates a constitutional straitjacket which will 
handicap sound efforts at reform, nor is it intended to have this effect. We 
encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable search for 
increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights o f the individual while 
promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws.23
As expressly stated by the Supreme Court, it is impossible for one to “foresee the 
potential alternatives for protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or 
the States.”24 The Court admitted that the warnings are only required when no “other 
fully effective means are adopted to notify the person of his right of silence and to assure 
that the exercise of the right will be scrupulously honored.”25 The Miranda dissent
22 Id  at 467-73.
23 Id  at 467.
24 Id
25 Id. at 479.
II
criticized the ruling as nothing more than “hazardous experimentation,”26 and warned that 
the “social costs of crime are too great” for such a cavalier approach. In response, the 
majority argued that “[t]he limits we have placed on the interrogation process should not 
constitute an undue interference with a proper system of law enforcement.”2'
The pre-interrogation warnings long administered by the FBI were praised by the 
Miranda majority as a practice which “can readily be emulated by state and local law 
enforcement agencies.”28 Yet the FBI-administered warnings were not inclusive of 
everything required by Miranda. Justice Clark noted in dissent that the FBI’s warnings 
are different from those propounded by the majority in two respects. First, “[t]he offer of 
counsel is articulated only as a ‘right to counsel;’ nothing is said about a right to have 
counsel present at the custodial interrogation.”24 Second, suspects are warned “of a right 
to free counsel i f  they are unable to pay, and the availability of such counsel from the 
Judge.”30 The problem with this latter warning, according to the dissent, was that it “[did] 
not indicate that the agent [would] secure counsel. Rather, the statement may well be 
interpreted by the suspect to mean that the burden is placed upon himself and that he may 
have counsel appointed only when brought before the judge or at trial-but not at custodial 
interrogation.”31
26 id  at 517
27 Id  at 481.
28 Id  at 486.
29 Id  at 501, n.3.
30 Id
31 Id.
12
CHAPTER TWO
Congressional Committees and Subcommittees are better situated to explore human 
experience, to analyze the impact o f  judicial decisions, to conduct detailed hearings, and 
to make extensive findings on the total situation than is a Court considering a single 
factual situation and a specific legal issue.3'
A. CONGRESS’ RESPONSE TO MIRANDA: 18 U.S.C. § 3501
The Court’s opinion in Miranda was not well received by Congress. The case
became a rallying point for local law enforcement, legislators and politicians who felt the 
Court had dealt yet another “disastrous blow to the cause of law enforcement in this 
country.”33 With few exceptions, most members were quite critical of the opinion. Soon 
after Miranda was unveiled, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on 
Criminal Laws and Procedures initiated discussions and it was from these discussions 
that the legislative process began, and from which the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Streets Act of 1968 (the “Act”) was formed. The legislative history of the Act, o f which § 
3501 is one part, recorded the opinions of both supporters and objectors to Miranda and 
included studies and surveys34 from various sources the results of which are used as
32 United States Code Congressional and Administrative News: 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2261 (82 Stat.
197)(“Mr. Scott”)
33 Id. at 2127. The criticism came in the wake o f  several other opinions: McNabb v. United States. 318 U.S. 
332 (1943), Mallory v. United States. 354 U.S. 449 (1957) and Escobedo v. Illinois. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
34 The studies mentioned in the legislative history include the following:
1. Arlen Specter, then District Attorney for the City o f  Philadelphia, noted that suspects would 
give statements, whether incriminating or not, 68% ofthe time before Miranda, and only 41%  
after the decision. Act o f  June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2128 (82 
Stat. 197).
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evidence to support their respective positions. It is clear from this legislative history that 
Congress strongly favored the passage of § 3501 and after some heated discussion in 
Congress the Act was passed. The statute, in relevant part, appears below:
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or 
by the District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in 
subsection (e) hereof, shall be admissible in evidence if it is 
voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in 
evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence o f the jury, 
determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge 
determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall 
be admitted in evidence and the trial judge shall permit the 
jury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of voluntariness 
and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the 
confession as the jury feels it deserves under all the 
circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall 
take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the 
giving of the confession, including
(1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of 
the defendant making the confession, if it was made 
after arrest and before arraignment,
(2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the 
offense with which he was charged or of which he 
was suspected at the time of making the confession,
(3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew 
that he was not required to make any statement and 
that any such statement could be used against him,
(4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior 
to questioning of his right to the assistance of 
counsel; and
2. Aaron Koota, District Attorney for Kings County, New York, conducted a survey indicating 
that 10% o f  suspects questioned refused to give a statement or confession prior to Miranda, 
opposed to 41% who refused after its arrival. Id-
3. Charles E. Moylan, Jr., State’s Attorney for the City o f  Baltimore, stated that the percentage 
o f  suspects who confessed to crimes before and after Miranda dropped from approximately 20 
to 25% down to 2%. Id.
4. Frank S. Hogan, District Attorney for New York County, New York, arrived at similar 
figures, with 49% making statements before and 15% after Miranda.Id. at 2129.
Not all studies concluded that Miranda was an important issue for the criminal justice system.
Judge Nathan Sobel conducted a study that revealed that only 10% o f all indictments contained a
confession. Id.
14
(5) whether or not such defendant was without the 
assistance of counsel when questioned and when 
giving such confession.
The presence or absence o f any of the above-mentioned 
factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not 
be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.
* * *
(d) Nothing contained in this section shall bar the admission in 
evidence of any confession made or given voluntarily by any 
person to any other person without interrogation by anyone, 
or at any time at which the person who made or gave such 
confession was not under arrest or other detention.
(e) As used in this section, the term "confession" means any 
confession of guilt o f any criminal offense or any self 
incriminating statement made or given orally or in writing.
18U.S.C. § 3501.
The main difference between the rule in Miranda and § 3501 is as follows: in 
Miranda, if  law enforcement fails to warn a suspect as required, then any confession or 
inculpatory statement made as a result must be suppressed. Section 3501 instead applied 
a totality of the circumstances approach. The reading of the warnings required by 
Miranda were but one of several factors to be considered by a judge in determining 
whether a confession or inculpatory statement should be admitted or suppressed. For 
example, if  a suspect was advised o f all the Miranda rights except the warning that 
counsel would be appointed to represent him if he could not afford to retain one, then 
under Miranda any statement made after such warnings would be suppressed. Under § 
3501, however, such a mistake would be but one factor of several that the judge may 
consider. Other factors include the time elapsed between arrest and confession, or 
whether the suspect knew with what offenses he was charged, or even whether he had 
with him an attorney at the time of his questioning. In fact, there are circumstances under
15
which Miranda would allow the admission of incriminating statements when § 3501 may 
have suppressed them. An example may be illustrative o f the difference.
A woman murders her husband, shoves his body into the trunk o f 
her Rolls Royce and takes him to a sand trap at his favorite golf course, 
where she buries him. She leaves the state for two weeks to celebrate.
Upon her return she goes straight to the local bar for the evening. On her 
way home she is stopped under suspicion that she is driving under the 
influence of alcohol. It is approximately 3:00 in the morning. After 
stopping the vehicle, the officer approaches her and determines that she is 
impaired: her speech is slurred and she is unsteady on her feet. When the 
officer takes her drivers license and asks her out o f the car, he realizes that 
she is the wife o f a person reported missing by his employer, and wanted 
for questioning. After failing several field tests, the woman is arrested for 
DUI and taken to the hospital to have a blood test, then on to the station.
Her Rolls Royce is impounded, angering the woman greatly. The officer 
arranged for the detective investigating the man’s disappearance to be 
waiting for her at the station. He sits down with her and reads the Miranda 
warnings to her quickly and without explanation. Handing her a rights 
waiver form, she signs at all the appropriate places and drops her head to 
the table, mumbling something about her car. The detective determines 
that although she was probably too drunk to drive, she was coherent and 
capable of waiving her rights. He then begins questioning her, but she only 
continues complaining about her impounded Rolls Royce. The detective 
asks her where her husband was, to which she sneers and says “what 
difference does that make? Maybe he is playing a really long game of 
golf!” She then mutters something about getting stuck in a sand trap then 
asks for her lawyer.
16
At trial, her attorney demands a hearing, alleging that the police 
violated Miranda. After a brief hearing the judge rules in favor o f law 
enforcement, noting that all the warnings were recited to her and she 
signed a waiver form. The attorney points out that she had no idea she was 
under suspicion o f murder. Had she known, she would have immediately 
asked for her attorney. The judge nevertheless admits the statements, 
pointing out that the defendant was properly Mirandized. The husband’s 
body is recovered beneath a sand trap near the ninth hole o f the local golf 
course.
Had § 3501 been applied, the judge may have suppressed the confession. Section 
3501 lists among several factors whether the suspect was aware o f the nature of the 
charges against her. Here, the suspect thought she was under arrest for DUI, not murder. 
Had she known, she certainly would have done things differently. Perhaps a more 
common and more likely example will be helpful. Suppose instead that before the 
detective recites to her the Miranda warnings, she looks at him and asks him if he likes to 
play golf. The detective gives her a quizzical look and responds “Sure. How about you?” 
The suspect says in response that she was not very good and always ended up in the sand 
trap. The detective then reads her the Miranda warnings but she refuses and asks for her 
lawyer. Something about her demeanor causes the detective to summon a police dog and 
his handler to check the local golf course, where the body of the suspect’s husband is 
found. When she is charged with murder and she calls her attorney, the attorney files a 
motion to suppress. At the hearing the judge discovers the suspect was not warned before 
the detective questioned her and suppresses the statement. The woman is released and the 
charges are dropped because there is no other evidence linking the murder to the woman.
17
Applying § 3501, the fact that the warnings were not read before the seemingly innocent 
exchange would be but one o f several factors to be considered in determining the 
admissibility of the confession.
If properly applied, § 3501 would allow the judge to use common sense when 
considering whether a confession should be admitted or suppressed. The judge would not 
be limited to a technical application of Miranda and instead could consider all the 
circumstances of a conversation. It is for this reason that § 3501 has been supported by so 
many in the field of law enforcement, as will be shown below.
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B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF § 3501
[C] rime will not be effectively abated so long as criminals who have voluntarily 
confessed their crimes are released on mere technicalities. The traditional right o f  the 
people to have their prosecuting attorneys place in evidence before juries the voluntary 
confessions and incriminating statements made by defendants simply must be restored**.
Some voices preserved in the legislative history echo popular criticisms of and 
arguments against Miranda, some of which are repeated today. As one prosecutor opined, 
“[t]he question of guilt or innocence becomes relegated to the background, because in 
many of these instances guilt isn’t seriously in dispute. The only matters that are tried 
nowadays are these side issues. And I must say that sometimes 1 feel, when I am trying a 
criminal case, as though I am . . . not trying the accused, 1 am trying the policeman . . .
»36
Another common criticism is that the Miranda ruling usurped the superior power 
of Congress to legislate on issues requiring ongoing research and study. The admissibility 
of confessions is such an issue. “The legislative process is far better calculated to set 
standards and rules by statute than is the process of announcing principles through court 
decision in particular cases where the facts are limited. The legislative process is better 
adapted to seeing the situation in all its aspects and establishing a system and rules which 
can govern a multitude of different cases.”37
35 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2128 (82 Stat. 197).
36 Id. at 2126 (quote from Judge Holtzoff, made during hearings on § 3501).
37 Id. at 2133 (quote from J. Edward Lumbard, Chief Judge, U.S. Court o f  Appeals, 2** Circuit).
19
Participants in the legislative history also expressed the opinion that the Court was 
mistaken about the widespread problem of police brutality and abusive tactics.38 The 
Court admittedly used as evidence of police action and current police practices several 
police manuals that outlined how interrogations should be handled.39 Looking at these 
manuals and public sentiment, the conclusion reached by several commentators was that 
“the Court overreacted to defense claims that police brutality is widespread.’40 The 
investigation conducted by Congress was much more in depth and involved more than 
researching police manuals. Historically, Congress has been best equipped to conduct 
fact-finding investigations, and it is often their role. The Supreme Court should decide 
cases and controversies. Here, the legislative history makes it clear that the Court reached 
a decision by investigating the facts and reaching a conclusion. Congress has applied the 
same rule as that announced in Miranda, only Congress reached a different conclusion by 
applying different facts and after much more research and debate. “Stated simply, the 
Court has previously made a constitutional decision . . .  on the basis of constitutional 
theory and of its appraisal of the facts . . . .  With [§ 3501], Congress did not change the 
constitutional theory; rather, it made its appraisal o f the facts and reached a different 
factual conclusion than the Court had.”41 Certainly the Court has the power to change the 
rule of law; in this case, however, it seems Congress was better equipped and prepared to 
fully investigate the facts and conduct the research required to reach a more informed 
conclusion.
38 See id. at 2134-35
39 Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436, 449 (1966).
40 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2134.
41 Id. at 2148.
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Eventually the Act, of which § 3501 was a part, was passed. What remained, 
however, was the question of whether and to what extent § 3501 would be applied. The 
Court, on the subject o f the right against self-incrimination, explicitly stated in its opinion 
in Miranda that Congress is “free to develop [its] own safeguards for the privilege, so 
long as they are fully as effective as those described above in informing accused persons 
of their right of silence and in affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it.”4* The 
question that remained was whether § 3501 would do so in practice.
C. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE COURT’S 
RESPONSE TO §3501
The position o f the Department of Justice during the Dickerson debate was that § 
3501 had been neither supported nor applied by previous administrations. Certainly its 
use has been sporadic at best through the years43. John Mitchell, Attorney General in 
1968 when § 3501 was passed, in a somewhat bland assertion, testified before the House
42 384 U.S. at 490.
43 See, e.g.. United States v. Albert M. Dickersoa 291 F.Supp. 633(N.D.I11. 1968)(Govemment argued 
admissibility o f  confession based on § 350 H: United States v. Crocker. 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 
1975)(“[T]he trial court did not err in applying the guidelines o f  section 3501 in determining the issue o f  
the voluntariness o f  Crocker’s confession.’’’): United States v. Powe. 591 F.2d 833(D.C.Ct.App.
1978)(Court discussed and applied both Miranda and § 3501 to a confession): United States v. Perez- 
Bustamonte. 963 F.2d 48, 53(5,h Cir. 1992)(“Under the § 3501 totality o f  the circumstances te st . . .  we 
cannot say that the delay prior to the confession rendered it inadmissible.”): United States v. Iwegbu. 6 F.3d 
272(5lh Cir. 1993)(Court applied § 3501); United States v. Makes Room for Them. 49 F.3d 410(8tfl Cir.
1995)(Court applied § 3501); United States v. Quinn. 123 F.3d 1415, 1424(11th Cir. 1997)(“The 
admissibility o f  confessions is covered by 18 U.S.C. §3501); United States v. Rosario-Diaz. et. al.. 2000 
WL 72080 (1st Cir.(Puerto Rico) 2000).
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Select Committee on Crime that “until such time as we are advised by the courts that [§ 
3501] does not meet constitutional standards, we should use it."44
Federal prosecutors used § 3501 in several cases, but primarily relied on Miranda. 
Because of this strategy, courts rarely needed to reach a conclusion as to § 350l ’s 
legitimacy: the investigating agents in each case persisted in using the warnings required 
by Miranda: thus there was no need to go past Miranda and apply § 3501.45 The position 
of the Justice Department on the legitimacy of § 3501, therefore, is at best mere 
speculation. What is certain is that the Court, with its opinion in Dickerson, settled any 
confusion on the issue.
44 85 Iowa L. Rev. 175, 199 (citing U.S. Dep't o f  Justice, Office o f  Legal Policy, Report to the Attorney 
General on the Law o f  Pre-trial Interrogation 67 (1986).
45 Despite law enforcement officer’s continued use o f  Miranda, there is no evidence to support the 
inference that they either approved or were critical o f  the rule.
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CHAPTER THREE
I f  errors are made by law enforcement officers in administering the prophylactic 
Miranda procedures, they should not breed the same irremediable consequences as 
police infringement o f  the Fifth Amendment itself It is an unwarranted extension o f  
Miranda to hold that a simple failure to administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any 
actual coercion or other circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to 
exercise his free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary and 
informed waiver is ineffective fo r  some indeterminate period.'"'
A. THE FACTS IN DICKERSON
On January 24, 1997, there was a robbery at the First Virginia Bank in 
Alexandria, Virginia. A witness saw the tag o f the getaway car and reported it. The FBI 
ran the tag and went to the address on record, which was registered to Dickerson. The 
FBI made contact with Dickerson, and while they were in his home they saw a large 
amount o f cash in plain view. After some questioning, Dickerson agreed to go to the FBI 
field office with them.
During Dickerson’s interview at the field office he admitted to being in the area of 
the robbery. The FBI contacted a judge who agreed over the telephone to sign a search 
warrant. The FBI then told Dickerson that agents were about to search his apartment.
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Some time later, Dickerson expressed the desire to make a statement. According to the 
FBI, Dickerson was read the Miranda warnings and signed a waiver agreeing to speak 
with the agents.47 He then admitted to being the getaway driver in the bank robbery, 
admitted to similar conduct in several other robberies. He identified another, Jimmy 
Rochester, as the actual bank robber. Dickerson also told the agents that after the 
robbery, Rochester gave him a silver handgun and some dy&stained money. Following 
these statements, Dickerson was placed under arrest.
The search of Dickerson’s apartment produced a silver .45 caliber handgun, 
dye-stained money, a bait bill from another robbery, ammunition, masks and latex gloves. 
Dickerson was indicted on several counts related to the bank robbery. Dickerson filed a 
motion to suppress those statements he made to the FBI, any evidence found as a result o f 
his statements, any physical evidence obtained during the search of his apartment and 
finally, any physical evidence obtained during the search o f his car. The Government 
submitted a brief in opposition to the motion to suppress. A hearing on the motion to 
suppress was held in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
on May 30, 1997.
B. THE TRIAL AND THE APPEAL
The FBI testified that Dickerson was read (and waived) his rights under Miranda 
prior to his confession and that he confessed “shortly after” the warrant was obtained to 
search Dickerson’s apartment. Dickerson, however, testified that he confessed prior to
46 Oregon v. Elstad. 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985).
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being read (and waiving) his Miranda rights and about “thirty minutes” after being 
informed about the warrant to search his apartment.
After reviewing the evidence, the district court suppressed Dickerson’s 
statements, finding that they were made while he was in police custody, in response to 
police interrogation and without the necessary Miranda warnings. The district court found 
that Dickerson was not advised of his Miranda rights until after he had completed his 
statement to the government.
The evidence found as a result o f the confession, which included the contacting 
and subsequent admission of Rochester, who later implicated Dickerson, was not 
suppressed. The district court, relying upon the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States 
v. Elie. 111 F.3d 1135 (4th Cir. 1997), noted that evidence found as a result o f a statement 
made in violation o f Miranda may only be suppressed if the statement was involuntary 
within the meaning o f the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Because 
Dickerson’s statement was voluntary by Fifth Amendment standards, the district court 
concluded that the evidence found as a result thereof was admissible at trial.
Thus, although the district court specifically found that Dickerson’s confession 
was voluntary for purposes of the Fifth Amendment, it nevertheless suppressed the 
confession because it was obtained in technical violation o f Miranda. In ruling on the 
admissibility o f Dickerson’s confession, the district court did not consider § 3501, which 
provides, in pertinent part, that “a confession ... shall be admissible in evidence if it is
47 There was a discrepancy between the time o f  the giving o f  the Miranda warnings and the confesion.
25
voluntarily given.’*48 Thus, if  the court applied § 3501 in Dickerson, then the defendant’s 
voluntary confession may have been admissible as substantive evidence in the 
Government’s case-in-chief.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Congress, 
“pursuant to its power to establish the rules of evidence and procedure in the federal 
courts, acted within its authority in enacting § 3501. As a consequence, § 3501, rather 
than Miranda, governs the admissibility of confessions in federal court.”49 The Fourth 
Circuit held that the Miranda warnings were not constitutional in nature, and that 
Miranda encouraged Congress and the states to create their own methods to protect one’s 
constitutional rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment. The Fourth Circuit held that 
Appellant’s confession was admissible because it was received in compliance with § 
3501.
C. THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT IN DICKERSON
i. INTRODUCTION
As was predicted by many, the Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit in 
Dickerson. The Court used many of the academic arguments familiar to those who have 
studied Miranda, but the most important of the issues was whether Miranda was a 
constitutional decision or merely a rule of evidence or procedure. If it is the former, then 
Congress does not have the power to change the rule through legislation. If the latter, 
then Congress can legislatively overrule the decision. The Dickerson Court held that 
Miranda was “constitutionally based” and made several arguments in support, but “first
48 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a).
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and foremost of the factors . . . that Miranda is a constitutional decision—is that both 
Miranda and two of its companion cases applied the rule to proceedings in state courts—to 
wit, Arizona, California, and New York.”50 Because the majority held that Miranda was 
constitutionally based, Congress did not have the power to legislatively override it. The 
majority cited several other common grounds for preserving Miranda, such as the idea 
that law enforcement prefers its “bright line rule,” or that as one of the most famous and 
celebrated decisions in criminal law, both stare decisis and public sentiment demand that 
Miranda remain the law of the land.
Of course the opinion was not without its detractors. Justice Scalia authored a sharp 
and biting dissent. He referred to the majority as a “nine-headed Caesar, giving thumbs- 
up or thumbs-down to whatever outcome, case by case, suits or offends its collective 
fancy.”51 He closed by stating that “until § 3501 is repealed, [he] will continue to apply it 
in all cases where there has been a sustainable finding that the defendant’s confession
o
was voluntary.’
Because the Court determined that Miranda is constitutionally based, § 3501 was held 
to have been improperly enacted and could no longer be applied. Had the Court 
determined otherwise, viz., that Miranda was not a constitutional rule and merely one of 
“constitutional dimensions,” then of course the Court would have been obliged under its 
own logic to recognize the legitimacy o f § 3501.
49 U.S. v. Dickerson. 166 F.3d 667, 671 (1999).
50 Id  at 2333.
51 Dickerson v. United States. 120 S.Ct. 2326, 2342 (2000).
52 Id. at 2348.
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ii. MAJORITY VIEW AND DISSENT
The argument of the majority can be consolidated into two related themes: first, that 
of the superiority and constitutionality o f Mjranda and second, as a concomitant issue, the 
insufficiency and illegitimacy of § 3501 as Miranda’s replacement. Both the dissent and 
the majority hold as mutually exclusive the requirements o f Miranda and the dictates o f § 
3501. “[Section] 3501 reinstates the totality test as sufficient. Section 3501 therefore 
cannot be sustained if Miranda is to remain the law.”53 “I agree with the Court that § 
3501 cannot be upheld without also concluding that Miranda represents an illegitimate 
exercise o f our authority to review state-court judgments....”54 In other words, the 
acceptance of one requires the invalidity of the other.
The majority begins by accepting one of the most basic premises of Miranda, that 
police interrogation by definition “exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on 
the weakness of individuals.”55 The majority concluded that police interrogation and 
practice leads to confessions that reside in a gray area between voluntary and involuntary 
under the Fifth Amendment, hence the necessity for a prophylactic rule such as Miranda. 
As correctly stated by the majority, the requirement that confessions be voluntary is a 
direct application of the Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against self-incrimination and the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.56 The conclusion reached in Miranda 
was that the centuries-old totality of the circumstances test for determining the
53 Id. at 2336(majority).
54 Id  at 2346(dissent).
55 Dickerson v. United States. 120 S.Ct. at 2 3 3 1 (citing Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. 436 ,455).
56 Id. at 2330.(The majority surveys case law as far back as 1783 as proof of its assertion 
that the requirement that confessions be voluntary has existed for hundreds o f years).
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voluntariness of a confession was not good enough to insulate oneself from the 
compulsive nature o f such interrogations.57 The list of warnings created in Miranda was 
the Court’s solution, and the Dickerson majority took great pains in affirming and 
justifying their continued use. Justice Scalia, in dissent, thought it absurd to assume that 
one who is not read the warnings required by Miranda is automatically subjected to such 
coercive power that one’s will is overborne.58 As he also correctly notes, almost everyone 
in our society is familiar with the Miranda warnings, and that there is “simply no basis in 
reason for concluding that a response to the very first questions asked, by a suspect who 
already knows all of the rights described in the Miranda warning, is anything other than a 
volitional act.”59 Justice Scalia added that the result of the Miranda warning that one has 
a right to counsel as early as the questioning stage of an investigation is to discourage the 
suspect from speaking to law enforcement at all.60 Scalia argued that such a warning is 
unnecessarily offensive to the entire idea of confessions and argues that “[t]he 
Constitution is not, unlike the Miranda majority, offended by a criminal’s commendable 
qualm of consciousness or fortunate fit o f stupidity.”61 One o f the main issues of 
contention in Dickerson was whether Miranda instituted a constitutional rule, viz., 
whether the Court’s holding in Miranda was an interpretation of the Constitution. 
Whether Miranda is a constitutional rule is important for several reasons. If indeed
57 “A confession may have been given voluntarily, although it was made to police officers, while in 
custody, and in answer to an examination conducted by them. But a confession obtained by compulsion 
must be excluded whatever may have been the character o f  the compulsion, and wheher the compulsion 
was applied in a judicial proceeding or otherwise.” Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. at 462(citing Bram v. 
United States. 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
58 Id, at 2338.
59 Id  at 2339.
60 Id.
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Miranda is a constitutional rule, then it is a pronouncement by the United States Supreme 
Court interpreting what some part of the Constitution means. This interpretation cannot 
be changed or defeated by later Congressional legislation.62 However, if it is merely a 
rule of evidence or procedure, viz., not an interpretation of the Constitution but a 
procedural rule as to how to apply the Fifth Amendment, for example, then Congress has 
the authority to legislatively overrule such a holding6' Conversely, if Congress has 
already spoken regarding such a rule, then the Supreme Court has no power to later 
supercede it.64 The separation of powers is a fundamental principle o f American 
jurisprudence. The dissent believed “[b]y disregarding congressional action that 
concededly does not violate the Constitution, the Court flagrantly offends fundamental 
principles of separation o f powers, and arrogates to itself prerogatives reserved to the 
representatives of the people.”6 ’
This is also important because the Supreme Court has no power to supervise the 
actions of state or local law enforcement unless such action somehow conflicts with the 
United States Constitution. In other words, the Court may only “correct wrongs o f 
constitutional dimension.”66 “With respect to proceedings in state courts, our ‘authority is 
limited to enforcing the commands of the United States Constitution.’”67 While this was 
not an issue in Dickerson, which involved the actions of the FBI, it was certainly relevant
61 Id. at 2340.
62 See, generally. City o f  Boem e v. Flores. 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Marfaurv v. M adisoa 1 Cranch 137, 2 
L.Ed. 60(1803).
63 Carlisle v. United States. 517 U.S. 416 (1996).
64 Dickerson. 120 S.Ct. at 2332.
65 Jd at 2342.
66 Dickerson. 120 S.Ct. at 2333.
67 Id  at 2333(citing Mu’Min v. V irginia 500 U.S. 504, 508-09( 1991)).
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in Miranda and important for states and local law enforcement agencies in the wake of 
Dickerson.
It is appropriate to note here one argument of the dissent, that in Oregon v. Elstad. 
470 U.S. 298 (1985), the Court held that a Miranda-defective confession is nevertheless 
admissible as impeachment evidence, while a confession deemed involuntary under the 
Fifth Amendment could not be used for any purpose.68 The dissent points out several 
other exceptions to Miranda that have developed over the years69, to which the Dickerson 
majority responds as follows: “[t]hese decisions illustrate the principle-not that Miranda 
is not a constitutional rule—but that no constitutional rule is immutable.”70 The dissent 
argues that this is nonsense, that if Miranda is indeed a constitutional rule, then there can 
be no exception for allowing evidence obtained in violation of the Miranda warnings into 
evidence.71
In a somewhat bizarre argument, the majority bolsters its support o f Miranda by 
arguing not only that the language of Miranda proves that it is a constitutional rule, but 
further, that this is so because Miranda has been applied to the states. In other words, 
because Miranda and its progeny have been applied to the states, Miranda must be an 
interpretation of the federal constitution. Otherwise, the holding would have no effect on 
the admissibility of confessions in state courts. Scalia vehemently disagreed, attacking 
this argument as judicial bootstrapping: “That the Court has, on rare and recent occasion,
68 Dickerson. 120 S.Ct. at 2341.
69 Most notably, the “public safety exception” and the “fruit o f  the poisonous tree” exception.ld. at 2341.
70 Id  at 2335.
71 Id. at 2342.
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repeated the mistake does not transform error into truth, but illustrates the potential for 
future mischief that the error entails.”72
The dissent was distressed at the variance between the result of a confession deemed 
involuntary under the Fifth Amendment and one deemed in violation only of Miranda. 
The difference in the result, viz., the fruits o f such a confession suppressed in the former 
example and admissible in the latter, does not obtain: if Miranda is a constitutional rule, 
then there should be no distinction as to such confessions: ‘in  my view, our continued 
application of the Miranda code to the States despite our consistent statements that 
running afoul of its dictates does not necessarily—or even usually—result in an actual 
constitutional violation, represents not the source of Miranda's salvation but rather 
evidence of its ultimate illegitimacy.”73
As for the language of Miranda, the Dickerson majority points out several passages in 
Miranda as proof that its drafters thought they were issuing a constitutional rule. Some of 
these passages include calling the warnings “safeguards to protect precious Fifth 
Amendment rights,” that the issues presented in Miranda were o f “constitutional 
dimensions,” and that the warnings were “grounded in a specific requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment o f the Constitution.”74 The majority preceded this litany with the admission 
that “we concede that there is language in some of our opinions that supports the view
n  c
taken by [the Fourth Circuit in Dickerson!.
72 Id  at 2345.
73 Id  at 2343.
74 Dickerson. 120 S.Ct. at 2334.
75 Id.
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The dissent is quite clear in its response: nowhere in Miranda does the majority say 
that a violation of its warnings amounts to a violation of the Fifth Amendment. The 
Dickerson majority, too, fails to expressly state in its opinion that a violation of Miranda 
is a violation of one’s constitutional rights.7'’ In fact, each Justice of the Dickerson 
majority has, in prior opinions, held that a violation of Miranda is not a violation of the 
Constitution.77
Another favorite argument of the majority is as follows:
[S]tare decisis carries such persuasive force that the Court has always 
required a departure from precedent to be supported by some special 
justification. . . . There is no such justification here. Miranda has become 
embedded in routine police practice to the point where the warnings have 
become part of our national culture.78
Essentially the majority believed that the prophylaxis o f Miranda could not be changed 
because the police have become accustomed to it and the public has seen it on television 
so often that the average child in America can recite it. Justice Scalia disagreed. “Far 
from believing that stare decisis compels this result, I believe we cannot allow to remain 
on the books even a celebrated decision- especially a celebrated decision-that has come 
to stand for the proposition that the Supreme Court has power to impose extra­
constitutional constraints upon the Congress and the States.”79
76 See Dickerson. 120 S.Ct. at 2342(dissent points out that the language o f  Miranda used as evidence by the 
Dickerson majority that they had announced a constitutional rule is nothing more than “word games”).
77 Id. at 2337(listing Justices and opinions in which they expressed such a view).
78 Id  at 2329.
79 Id. at 2348.
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iii. IS MIRANDA A CONSTITUTIONAL RULE?
A brief inspection o f the Miranda opinion reveals the probability that the 
warnings are not constitutionally required. “We have already pointed out that the 
Constitution does not require any specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege 
against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation. Congress and the States are free 
to develop their own safeguards for the privilege . . . .”80 The Supreme Court has 
consistently referred to these warnings as “prophylactic measures,” New York v. Quarles. 
467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984), “procedural safeguards,” Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. at 444, 
and “not themselves rights protected by the Constitution.” Dickerson v. United States, 
166 F.3d at 672(citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974)).
Defenders of Miranda have consistently cited one passage in the voluminous 
opinion in which the majority opines that “the issues presented are of constitutional 
dimensions and must be determined by the courts.”81 From these vague words alone some 
have argued that the warnings required under Miranda are actually required by the 
Constitution. Considering the language in the rest o f the opinion, it is likely that the 
passage was intended to convey the idea that the warnings are not themselves per se 
required but the presumption in their absence will be that a suspect’s Fifth Amendment 
rights were not protected unless there was some objective basis, some overt attempt to 
inform a suspect of his rights, upon which law enforcement can demonstrate its 
compliance with Miranda. The Court admitted that the Constitution does not require a
80 Id  at 490.
“specific code” to protect one’s rights during questioning and that Congress and the 
States are free to “develop their own safeguards.” The only qualification was that they be 
“fully as effective . . .  in informing accused persons o f  their right o f silence and in 
affording a continuous opportunity to exercise it.”*2 What o f the right to have counsel 
appointed or an explicit statement o f the right to have counsel present during 
questioning? The conspicuous absence o f these other warnings from this qualification can 
only underscore the argument that they are not required by the Constitution.
It is plausible that the absence o f the additional warnings suggests that in order for 
the police to pass constitutional muster a suspect need only be warned o f  his right o f 
silence and his continuous opportunity to exercise that right.83 This assertion is defensible 
for two reasons. First, the other rights in question, including the appointment o f  counsel 
to indigent persons and the right to have counsel present during questioning, “actually 
derive from quotation and analogy drawn from precedents under the Sixth amendment, 
which should properly have no bearing on police interrogation.”84 Therefore, these rights 
should not attach until adversary proceedings have begun. Second, the Miranda majority 
asserted that the FB I’s form o f pre-interrogation warnings was a model for other agencies 
to emulate. The FBI, however, does not include in its warnings a clear statement o f the 
indigent suspect’s right to the appointment o f  counsel and no warning at all o f  the right to 
have counsel present during questioning, which are both explicitly required by Miranda. 
Thus, it is questionable whether Miranda truly was intended to specifically require the
81 Id  at 490.
82 Id.
83 Id.
84 384 U.S. at 510.
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above-mentioned warnings; this is especially true considering the substance o f these
warnings, which more properly belongs to the Sixth Amendment and its progeny.
The advocates o f § 3501 mustered a formidable defense of the statute, as did the
many amicus curiae who filed supporting briefs.85 In any event, the fight was lost and
Miranda appears to be here to stay. Section 3501 is still printed in the United States Code,
but with the Court’s proclamation in Dickerson it seems only to be a matter o f time
before the statute is repealed. Given the Court’s rule in Miranda, the question that
remains is whether the criminal justice system is better off with Miranda as it now stands,
or with some other solution or re-interpretation. As for whether Miranda is a
constitutional rule, the Dickerson majority made the answer to that question no more
clear than Miranda itself:
The dissent argues that it is judicial overreaching for this Court to hold §
3501 unconstitutional unless we hold that the Miranda warnings are
required by the Constitution............. But we need not go farther than
Miranda to decide this case. In Miranda, the Court noted that reliance on 
the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk o f 
overlooking an involuntary custodial confession, . . .  a risk that the Court 
found unacceptably great when the confession is offered in the case in 
chief to prove guilt. The Court therefore concluded that something more 
than the totality test was necessary. . . .  As discussed above, § 3501 
reinstates the totality test as sufficient. Section 3501 therefore cannot be 
sustained if Miranda is to remain the law.
In the end, and without any actual support, the majority held that “Miranda 
announced a constitutional rule that Congress may not supersede legislatively.’^ 7 In other 
words, the Court essentially avoided the question of whether Miranda was actually a
85 Mr. Paul G. Cassell, a law professor at the University o f  Iowa, dedicated much o f  his time over the past 
years supporting a remedy for the (problems) with Miranda. In addition to his scholarly contributions he 
had the honor to be heard in oral argument to the United States Supreme Court in Dickerson.
86 Id  at 2336.
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constitutional rule, basing their decision instead on the fact that § 3501 was simply 
inadequate. “Whether or not we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting 
rule, were we addressing the issue in the first instance, the principles of stare decisis 
weigh heavily against overruling it now.”88
A very recent decision from the Supreme Court of Tennessee illustrates these 
observations. In Tennessee v. Walton. No. W1998-00329-SC-R11-CD (Tn. Sup. Ct. 
March 15, 2001), police officers asked a man suspected of several burglaries to come to 
the station house to speak with them. The suspect agreed, but before getting into the 
police car the officers informed him that for their safety he had to wear handcuffs. The 
suspect was specifically informed that he was not under arrest. On the way to the station 
the suspect mentioned the name of Charles Thompson, and told the officers “I know what 
lies and things that [Thompson has been] telling on me. And I've got some information 
where we can get him."89 The suspect proceeded to direct the police officers all over 
town, including his own home, making several stops to point out hidden items that the 
officers had known were stolen. At times the suspect would give the police officers 
directions, then would exit the police car and lead them to the property.
After the suspect finished he was brought to the station, where he was Mirandized 
and signed a written waiver of those rights. He then detailed a complete statement for the 
police officers. At trial the defendant moved for suppression of his statements and the 
evidence acquired as a result of those statements. When the trial court denied the motion
87 Id-
M-
’Id. at *1.
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the defendant pled guilty. On appeal the motion was granted and the charges were
dismissed because the Court o f Criminal Appeals believed that regardless o f the
spontaneity o f the statements, they “were not made by the defendant with the full
knowledge o f  his rights.”90
The Tennessee Supreme Court remanded. In so doing, the Court had been
concerned whether or not “a violation o f  Miranda is also now a violation o f the Fifth
Amendment.”91 The Court looked to Dickerson and determined that it did not, as “this
reading is contradicted by the language o f the opinion itself.”92 The Court continued:
Not only did the majority plainly refuse to extend its holding that far, but 
the majority also limited its decision to holding that the "totality o f the 
circumstances" test, without more, is inadequate to protect the privilege 
against self- incrimination. Indeed, when read in this context, Dickerson 
practically does little more than did Miranda itself, which, in holding that 
the "totality o f the circumstances" test was insufficient to safeguard Fifth 
Amendment protections, was clear that the constitution did not require any 
particular set o f procedures.
* * *
[W]e have never viewed the failure to administer the Miranda warnings as 
an actual violation o f  the Fifth Amendm ent.93
Thus, it seems the best that can be said is that a violation o f Miranda is not necessarily a 
violation o f  the Fifth Amendment. Constitutional rule or not, Miranda is still the law, and 
the question becomes how it is to be interpreted or whether it is causes more harm than 
good.
90 Id  at *3.
91 Id  at *10.
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CHAPTER FOUR
Our dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused. Our procedure has been 
always haunted by the ghost o f  the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What 
we need to fea r  is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs, delays 
and defeats the prosecution o f  crime.94
A. EMPIRICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST MIRANDA
Defenders o f Miranda worried that the affirmance o f § 3501 would have clogged 
up the already severely taxed court systems with voluntariness determinations. This is not 
supported by the evidence.95 First, in state courts the percentage o f criminal cases that 
actually go to trial are very low. See generally. Andrew Horwitz, “Taking the Cop Out o f 
Copping a Plea: Eradicating Police Prosecution o f Criminal Cases,” 40 Ariz. L. Rev. 
1305, 1378 (1998)(In the year o f  1995 only 4% o f criminal cases went to trial). The 
number is not significantly higher in federal courts. See H.W. Perry, Jr., “United States 
Attorneys- Whom Shall They Serve?,” 61-WTR LCPR 129 (1998)(no publication page 
references available)(12% o f all criminal cases in federal courts are settled by trial). If a 
voluntariness hearing is held and the judge rules in favor o f the defendant then there is no
92 Id
93 Id.
94 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2263 (82 Stat. 197)fciting U.S. v. Garsson. 291 F. 646, 649
(S.D.N.Y., Feb 01, 1923)(Leamed Hand, District Judge).
95 For an exhaustive summary and discussion o f  various studies over the decades o f  the effect o f  Miranda, 
see Paul G. Cassell, Miranda’s Social Costs: An Empirical Reassessment, 90 Nw. U.L.Rev. 387(1996).
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trial. Therefore it is difficult to argue that a voluntariness determination overly taxes the 
courts.96
Second, the criminal justice system is not solely responsible for the heavy 
administrative burdens borne by the courts. At least equally responsible are the civil 
dockets and other judicial duties. If “clogged courts” are the concern, then there are less 
drastic means that are less likely to intrude upon the rights o f  the criminal defendant. For 
example, states can raise the amount in controversy limits that dictate whether civil cases 
are filed in superior courts or elsewhere, such as in magistrate court, thereby freeing to 
some degree the superior courts’ time for hearing felony cases. Another obvious 
resolution would be to hire more judges, or institute better, more modem alternatives 
such as drug courts or teen courts. These are but three examples o f  less intrusive means 
available to lighten the burden o f the courts; prohibiting voluntariness hearings to ease 
this burden is far more costly to the criminal justice system. These alternatives involve in 
large part a mere administrative redistribution o f  resources.97
Furthermore, Miranda itself does not supplant the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition 
against coerced confessions; therefore any question regarding the voluntariness o f a 
confession under Miranda would require a hearing anyway. Such is the case with 
Miranda. § 3501 or any other conceivable procedure. This means that choosing Miranda 
over § 3501 or some other option in no way saves any court any amount o f  time. It
96 Further, hearings to determine the voluntariness o f  a statement or confession are already held in virtually 
every criminal case that goes to trial and involves such a statement.
97 Some options that could be discussed in Georgia include: allowing state probation violations to be heard 
by an administrative law judge, or allowing defendants to plea guilty with a joint recommendation for 
punishment outside o f  court, with the plea to be judicially reviewed after the fact to ensure it was voluntary.
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merely selects the substance o f  the arguments that will be asserted during any 
voluntariness hearings.
There is even evidence that Miranda itself has burdened the courts more than 
mere voluntariness hearings. “It is not immediately apparent . . . that the judicial burden 
has been eased by the "bright-line" rules adopted in Miranda. In fact, in the 34 years 
since Miranda was decided, this Court has been called upon to decide nearly 60 cases 
involving a host o f Miranda issues, most o f  them predicted with remarkable prescience 
by Justice White in his Miranda dissent.”9ti
Another argument cited by the Dickerson majority is that many local law 
enforcement agencies would prefer to keep Miranda in place. The truth or falsity o f that 
statement aside, this fact should be completely irrelevant in determining whether Miranda 
should be applied in federal courts. Section 3501, for example, would only apply in the 
courts o f states that have adopted the statute in whole or in part.99 It is clear from the 
opinion in Miranda that Congress, as well as the states, are free to follow Miranda or 
apply their own “fully effective” alternative.100 Even today’s Dickerson Court remains 
cautiously vague as to the issue o f  whether it fully supports Miranda, choosing instead to 
say that it is a constitutional rule and therefore cannot be legislatively overruled by 
Congress.101 But the Court is not silent102.
98 Dickerson. 120 S.Ct. at 2347.
99 O f course, by now Miranda has been firmly entrenched in every state’s highest court and will, therefore, 
continue to be applied unless and until each individual state chooses to adopt some form of§  3501.
100 Id, at 479.
101 id, at 2336
102 “Whether or not we would agree with Miranda's reasoning and its resulting rule . . .  the principles o f  
stare decisis weigh heavily against overruling it now. Id.
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Not only is the opinion o f local law enforcement irrelevant as applied to the issues 
presented here, but the opinion o f law enforcement itself as presented by the Dickerson 
majority is subject to dispute. Virtually every major law enforcement support group was 
represented by amicus brief to the United States Supreme Court in support o f  § 3501.10' 
Even a former Assistant United States Attorney who was the Chief o f Appeals in Virginia 
when Dickerson began made his feelings known to the Department o f Justice.104 Even 
after Dickerson, it is o f significance that subsequent cases have nevertheless applied or at 
least discussed the language o f § 3501.105 While some in the criminal justice 
community106 have voiced their preference for Miranda because they see it as a bright- 
line rule and thus a perceived ease o f administration for police and courts, there is no
103 To name a few: Americans for Effective Law Enforcement, Inc., The International Association o f  Chiefs 
o f  Police, Inc., The National Sheriff s Association, The Virginia Association o f  Chiefs o f Police and the 
Fraternal Order o f  Police.
104 William G. Otis, upon his resignation from the Department o f  Justice, wrote Seth Waxman on 
September 13, 1999, encouraging the Department to preserve § 3501.
“We find Coleman's confession was knowingly and voluntarily given in accordance 
with both [Miranda and § 3501].” United States v. Coleman. 225 F.3d 655 (4th Cir. July 
25, 2000); "Courts look to 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) to determine whether pre-arraignment 
statements obtained in violation o f Rule 5(a) are admissible." United States v. Oroneza- 
Flores. 230 F.3d 1368 (9th Cir. Aug. 30, 2000). One should note that these opinions were 
unpublished, and until recently, unpublished opinions were o f  limited precedential value. 
That issue has been settled, and unpublished opinions are entitled to precedential value as 
is any other judicial opinion. See Anastasoff v. United States. 223 F.3d 898, 900(8lh Cir. 
August 22, 2000)(case rendered moot at rehearing for unrelated reason in Anastasoff v. 
United States. 235 F.3d 1054(8th Cir. Dec. 18, 2000)). The holding in Anastasoff has 
been recognized in virtually every other circuit. See generally Amgen. Inc. v. Hoechst 
Marion Roussel. Inc.. 126 F.Supp.2d 69, 136(D.Mass. Jan. 19, 2001); Luciano v. U.S.. 
2000 WL 1597771, * 1 (E.D.N.Y. Oct 23, 2000); In re Mays. 256 B.R. 555, 559 
(Bkrtcy.D.N.J. Dec. 19,2000); U.S. v. Lopez-Pastrana. 2001 WL 293262, *12 (C.A.9 
(Nev.), Jan. 12, 2001); U.S. v. Carrillo. 123 F.Supp.2d 1223, 1247 (D.Colo. Nov. 20, 
2000).
106 Not to mention lawyers and politicians.
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evidence that this group is o f a significant size or in the majority o f  those law 
enforcement professionals with an opinion on the matter.107
Assuming that there is a significant number o f law enforcement professionals who 
prefer to follow the dictates o f Miranda, there is yet another, more fundamental reason 
why that opinion is irrelevant. The ease o f  administration for the police o f  a rule o f  this 
Court in securing the constitutional rights o f the people should never be a part o f  the 
calculus this Court applies in determining which o f several rules should be preserved. 
This is especially true when the rule in question, although easier to administer, does not 
offer as complete a protection as another proposed rule. Simply put, just because a rule is 
easier to apply does not mean it is more protective o f one’s rights under the Constitution. 
Also, just because the police like one rule better than another is not, and never has been, a 
reason for preserving the rule.
As already discussed, § 3501 has never achieved the fame and universal 
application enjoyed by M iranda. One obvious reason why this is the case is that law 
enforcement continued to use Miranda; indeed, members o f  law enforcement had already 
acquired the habit o f  asking the famous questions. Perhaps a bright line rule offered 
comfort to line officers unaware o f § 3501. Because o f this practice, federal prosecutors 
rarely bothered to argue § 3501 because it was not necessary; if  Miranda was satisfied 
then there would be no reason to further complicate matters. Thus, courts rarely had to 
address the issue o f  whether § 3501 was valid: once they determined that M iranda was 
followed, courts simply did not go further.
107 There is certainly no evidence cited in the briefs to the Court or the opinion itself.
43
So Miranda remains. The Court has made it clear that Congress has but a limited 
part in the discussion; § 3501 has been overruled and any attempt by Congress to change 
the rule now will be met with a scrutiny too strict for any legislation to survive. One is 
left with the same problem discerned by those who enacted § 3501 over thirty years ago; 
that o f incriminating statements and confessions being suppressed because they were 
made in technical violation o f  Miranda and despite the fact that a violation o f Miranda is 
not necessarily a violation o f the Fifth Amendment. Without turning to legislation, the 
only avenue left for one trying to avoid this result is through the judiciary. If Miranda is 
here to stay, then a re-interpretation o f the rule may prove helpful. This thesis will next 
explore such a possibility and then suggest one such re-interpretation.
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CHAPTER FIVE
[J] ustice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept o f  fairness 
must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true.,os
A. ARGUMENT
The result o f  a technical violation o f  Miranda is the suppression o f a confession or 
any other statements. Depending on the nature o f the violation, it can also result in the 
exclusion o f any evidence that stems from those statements. This is far too costly a result 
for such a violation. Consider an example:
A man murders a child. Several days go by, and the police have no leads.
Feeling remorse, the perpetrator wants to admit his crimes to law 
enforcement. He calls the assigned detective to confess, and the detective 
secures a warrant for the m an’s arrest. He then sends a uniformed police 
officer to the caller’s home. The officer arrives and places the man in 
custody and brings him to the station. On the way to the station, it begins 
to rain very hard, and the rain turns to sleet. The officer begins talking 
about the fact that the child deserves to have a proper Christian burial, 
instead o f lying exposed in the woods somewhere in the cold and rain. The 
man eventually makes several incriminating statements, including giving 
the location o f the child. When they arrive at the police station the man is
108 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2263 (82 Stat. 197)(citine Snvder v. Commonwealth o f  Massachusetts 291 U.S. 
97,122, 54 S.Ct. 330(1934)(Cardozo, J.).
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charged with murder. At trial the perpetrator’s lawyer argues that the 
statements must be suppressed because the man was never read the 
warnings required by Miranda. The statements are suppressed.109
The defendant portrayed above was being given a ride to the police station at the
defendant’s request and in the course of a conversation with a police officer, he made
incriminating remarks. It was hardly the coercive environment feared by the Miranda
Court. Miranda could not have intended nor foreseen the full implications o f  its opinion,
and Dickerson recognized as much. “No court laying down a general rule can possibly
foresee the various circumstances in which counsel will seek to apply it, and the sort o f
modifications represented by these cases are as much a normal part o f constitutional law
as the original decision.” 110 Indeed, a strict observance o f the Court’s prophylactic rule in
Miranda would indeed hamper criminal investigations, and later courts strayed from the
rule in several significant ways. Some o f the most important exceptions follow.
The Supreme Court has chiseled away at Miranda over the decades, creating
various exceptions to the rule in an effort to accommodate the ever-changing nature o f
society and the law. In Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 433 (1974), the Court held that
evidence obtained based on the substance o f a Miranda-defective confession can be
admissible in court even if  the statement itself is suppressed. In Harris v. New York. 401
U.S. 222 (1971), it created an exception allowing evidence to be admitted that was
obtained in violation o f  Miranda for the purpose o f impeaching the testimony o f the
defendant. From New York v. Quarles. 467 U.S. 649 (1984), came the birth o f  the public
109 Taken loosely from Brewery. Williams. 430 U.S. 387 (1977)(the actual case is factually similar, but the 
Court suppressed the statements as made in violation o f  the defendant’s 6h Amendment right to counsel).
110 Id. at 2335.
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safety exception to Miranda, allowing the admission into court o f statements elicited 
from a defendant when the public safety is at risk. Finally, in Oregon v. Elstad. 470 U.S. 
298 (1985), the Court even recognized the admissibility o f  properly Mirandized 
statements that followed a Miranda-defective confession. The practical result o f these 
rulings is that a Miranda- defective confession can often be, and often is, used against a 
defendant in court.
Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. 433 (1974), was decided relatively soon after 
Miranda.111 In Tucker, the defendant was advised o f all those rights required by Miranda, 
save for his right to have counsel appointed free o f charge if  he could not afford one. The 
confession that resulted led officers to a witness who was questioned and later called to 
testify in trial. The question before the Court was whether the subsequent witness’ 
testimony would be allowed even though it was discovered through the defendant’s 
confession, which was obtained without a proper warning as required by Miranda. The 
Tucker Court’s response phrased the issue presented in this thesis quite succinctly11::
Our determination that the interrogation in this case involved no 
compulsion sufficient to breach the right against compulsory self­
incrimination does not mean there was not a disregard, albeit an 
inadvertent disregard, o f the procedural rules later established in 
Miranda. The question for decision is how sweeping the judicially 
imposed consequences o f this disregard shall be.113
111 Though not a significant factor in the plurality opinion, it is o f  historical interest to note that the facts o f  
the case actually predated the opinion reached in Miranda.
112 Despite his opinion in Dickerson, in Tucker now C hief Justice Rehnquist held that Miranda was not 
required by the Constitution, thus a violation o f  Miranda did not indicate a concomitant violatiai o f  one’s 
Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself. “The Court recognized that these procedural safeguards 
were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution but were instead measures to insure that the right 
against compulsory se lf  incrimination was protected.” Michigan v. Tucker. 417 U.S. at 444.
113 Id  at 445.
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Thus, the Court determined that the violation o f the procedural rules o f  Miranda did not 
necessarily render the confession involuntary. The Court decided that such evidence 
should be admissible despite the initial defects in the investigatory process. The Tucker 
Court recognized that the efficacy o f  the criminal justice system would be compromised 
by the imposition o f  technical rules that ignore good and valuable evidence. “[W]hen 
balancing the interests involved, we must weigh the strong interest under any system o f 
justice o f making available to the trier o f  fact all concededly relevant and trustworthy 
evidence which either party seeks to adduce.” 114 Tucker is important for its recognition o f 
the fact that Miranda is a procedural rule designed to protect one’s constitutional rights, 
but not actually a constitutional right in itself. Tucker also illustrated that Miranda can be 
placed on a “continuum o f coercion.” At one end would be the classic involuntary 
confession, an interrogation taking place with the infamous “bamboo shoots under the 
fingernails,” and on the other end would be perhaps a simple police-citizen exchange o f  
pleasantries. Tucker offers the proposition that a technical violation o f Miranda falls 
somewhere in between, and closer to the latter than the former. But o f all the famous 
exceptions to Miranda, it is the case that follows which is most significant for promoting 
further scrutiny o f the rule created in Miranda and preserved in Dickerson.
In New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984), the Court allowed the statement o f  
one tackled by a police officer then handcuffed to be used in court although the Miranda 
warnings were neither given nor even attempted. It is a landmark decision. In that case, a
114 Id. at 450.
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woman approached two police officers and told them she had just been raped and that the
person who raped her had entered a nearby supermarket. One o f the officers radioed
dispatch so backup could arrive while the other officer entered the store, saw the suspect
and chased him. After tackling and handcuffing the suspect, he discovered an empty
shoulder holster on him. While Quarles was still on the ground, and without reciting the
Miranda warnings, he asked the suspect where he hid the gun. The defendant revealed the
location o f the weapon, said something like “the gun is over there,” and the officer
retrieved it. Several other police officers arrived to take control o f the scene and no-one
was injured. After retrieving the gun the officer read the defendant the Miranda warnings
from a pre-printed card, and the defendant waived his right to have an attorney present
and answered the officer’s questions about the weapon.
The New York Supreme Court suppressed the gun and his statements due to the
failure o f the officer to read Miranda, despite the fact that the defendant subsequently
waived those rights described in the warnings. Both the New York Supreme Court
Appellate Division and the New York Court o f Appeals affirmed the suppression. On
certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, the New York Court o f Appeals was
reversed and the original statement and the gun itself was allowed under what came to be
known as the “public safety” exception to the Miranda rule.
The Court asserted that the situation before them was factually different from that
in Miranda, and that the facts in Quarles justified an exception to the rule.
Whatever the motivation o f individual officers in such a situation, we do 
not believe that the doctrinal underpinnings o f Miranda require that it be 
applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask questions 
reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety . . . .  Procedural
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safeguards which deter a suspect from responding were deemed acceptable 
in Miranda in order to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege; when the 
primary social cost o f  those added protections is the possibility o f fewer 
convictions, the Miranda majority was willing to bear that cost.1 ,s
So the Court created an artificial distinction between a “concern for the public safety” 
and merely the “possibility o f  fewer convictions.”116 The Court thought that the temporal 
immediacy o f an incident would dictate the level o f threat to society. The Court had the 
utmost faith in law enforcement being able to determine the difference: “We think police 
officers can and will distinguish almost instinctively between questions necessary to 
secure their own safety or the safety o f the public and questions designed solely to elicit 
testimonial evidence from a suspect.” 117
Quarles has become a well established exception to Miranda, and has achieved 
nationwide approval. It has been expanded over the years in several cases to 
accommodate societal and legal development. In Price v. Indiana. 591 N.E.2d 1027 
(1992), the suspect shot his victim with a rifle, then fled the area. When the police 
arrived, the victim gave the officers the suspect’s name and told them he had a rifle. Later 
the police stopped several people asking if  one o f them was the suspect. When the 
suspect identified him self the police pointed a gun at his head and took him to the 
ground. They demanded he tell them where the rifle could be located, as it obviously was
lls New York v. Quarles. 467 U.S. 649, 656-57 (1984).
116 Id.
117 Id. at 659.
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not on his person, and the suspect responded as follows: "I ain’t gonna lie, I shot her and 
I'll show you where the gun is."118 The court found a public safety exception existed119.
Even more telling is the scenario in Wisconsin v. Kunkel. 404 N.W.2d 69 (1987). 
In Kunkel. a small child had been missing for over 24 hours. The defendant was the 
prime suspect and he was arrested around midnight, brought to the jail and waited over an 
hour before he was questioned by a detective, in what was determined by the trial court to 
be an interrogation in violation o f the technical requirements o f Miranda.120 The 
detective’s stated goal was to bring the child to safety as soon as possible. The detective 
was too late. The court o f appeals in Wisconsin, in finding a public safety exception to 
the requirements o f Miranda, compared Quarles to a California rule even older than 
Miranda, known as the rescue doctrine121. The court then analogized its case to Quarles, 
and pointed out that while Quarles addressed the risk o f  harm to innocent persons in a 
general sense, here the court recognized a similar exception when the harm was to a 
specific person:
The overriding similarity between the facts in Quarles and those before us 
is a danger to life which must be weighed against the risk that a guilty 
suspect might eventually go free. The Quarles court weighed the public 
safety against that risk. We must weigh a possible imminent loss o f a 
known person's life against the risk that a guilty suspect might be freed for 
want o f  evidence obtained from the suspect's own lips.
1,8 Id  at 1028.
119 For a more recent example, see Pennsylvania v. Stewart 740 A.2d 712(1999).
120 When the detective Mirandized the suspect, the suspect responded that he could not afford a lawyer, but 
the detective began his interrogation anyway. The court determined that this was an invocation o f  his right 
to counsel. Id. at 74.
121 People v. Modesto. 62 Cal.2d 436, 398 P.2d 753 (1965)(“where the interrogation o f  a suspect is 
undertaken by the police for the paramount reason that information is being sought to save a life, the 
interrogating officers are justified in "not impeding their rescue efforts byinforming defendant o f  his rights 
to remain silent and to the assistance o f  counsel." [cits, omitted] The interest in saving a human life is 
considered to be outside o f  the parameters o f  the constitutional protection afforded against se lf  
incrimination. Kunkel. 404 N.W .2d at 74.
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* * *
The companion to the public safety exception must be a private safety 
exception, whether labelled as such or as a "rescue doctrine." In our 
calculus the possible imminent loss o f the life o f  a known and identifiable 
individual is entitled to the same weight as the public safety. If on the 
facts before it, the Quarles court could conclude that the need for answers 
to protect the public safety outweighed the need for Miranda warnings, 
then surely, on the facts before us, it is reasonable to conclude that the 
need for answers to protect the life o f one person outweighs the same 
need.122
Quarles is no magic cure to a violation o f Miranda, however, and under certain 
circumstances, courts have refused to apply it. In Iowa v. Peases. 518 N.W.2d 784 
(1994), one prison inmate murdered another with a shank.123 The inmate was taken into 
custody and the shank secured in evidence. Authorities then questioned the inmate in a 
manner determined to be violative o f Miranda. The state, in response to the defendant’s 
appeal after his conviction, argued that the questions were admissible subject to the 
public safety exception because they were asked in order to determine whether there were 
other shanks loose in the prison that were potentially dangerous to the prison population. 
The court refused to recognize the exception, first, because the shank in question had 
been secured along with the suspect, thus neutralizing the threat and second, because the 
questioning sought to be admitted “[did] not reflect this limited purpose.” 124
In Utah v. Montoya. 937 P.2d 145 (1997), the suspect was questioned in violation 
o f Miranda while under suspicion for using heroin. The suspect was acting extremely 
irrational, harassing patrons o f a store while undressed, and had trouble speaking to
122 Id  at 76.
123 A shank is a crude prison made knife, made from metal scraps or other material.
124 Id  at 791.
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police officers when they were dispatched to the scene. His condition seemed to
progressively worsen, and police officers called for medical assistance. They asked the
suspect if  he was on drugs, and he responded affirmatively. He was arrested and an
inventory o f his vehicle revealed the presence o f  heroin. After the trial court denied
defendant’s motions to suppress, he was convicted for the possession o f  heroin. The
defendant appealed these rulings. On appeal the state argued that the answers to the
questioning should be admitted, even though in violation o f Miranda, based on a
paternalistic interpretation o f  the public safety exception. In an argument reminiscent o f
California’s rescue doctrine,125 the prosecution asserted that the defendant posed a risk o f
danger to himself. The court was not convinced.
In Quarles, the Court was concerned about the safety o f the general public, 
not the safety o f  a particular defendant. Here, there was no showing that 
there was any danger o f imminent harm to the public at large. The State's 
attempt to expand the "narrow exception" devised in Quarles to a situation 
in which a defendant's personal safety may be at risk goes far beyond the 
underlying purpose o f  the public safety exception to the Miranda rule, and 
we decline to so extend the exception.126
Since the public safety exception was created, it has been tested many times. In 
some cases courts have been willing to expand the doctrine, and in others they have 
refused. Courts have not limited the exception to finding hidden weapons; nor has it been 
limited to the initial split-second response o f  uniformed police officers into a 
“kaleidoscopic situation.” 127 Kunkel expanded the public safety exception to include a 
jailhouse interrogation in the middle o f the night over 24 hours after the crime in question
125 People v. Modesto. 62 Cal.2d 436, 398 P.2d 753 (1965).
126 Montova. 937 P.2d at 151.
127 Quarles. 467 U.S. at 649.
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had occurred.128 Certainly, if  the public safety exception applied in such a case as Kunkel
by a detective interrogating a suspect in the middle o f the night in a jail and 24 hours after
a crime, it could have been applied under the facts o f Dickerson.
Quarles is no panacea, however. Miranda requires that unwarned custodial
statements that are in response to police questioning cannot be used in evidence. That
part o f the opinion is quite clear. Quarles is in direct conflict with that very basic
requirement o f Miranda. It is the only exception that is not founded on some later attempt
by a defendant to take unfair advantage o f  the Miranda rule. These other exceptions
include the ability o f the state to impeach a defendant with his Miranda-defective
confession when he takes the stand and lies, for “the shield provided by Miranda cannot
be perverted into a license to use perjury by way o f a defense, free from the risk o f
confrontation with prior utterances.” 129 If the defendant takes the stand in his trial and
maintains that he was not at the scene o f the crime, the prosecution may impeach him
with his earlier incriminatory statement, As the Harris Court further opined:
If, for example, an accused confessed fully to a homicide and led the 
police to the body o f the victim under circumstances making his 
confession inadmissible, the petitioner would have us allow that accused 
to take the stand and blandly deny every fact disclosed to the police or 
discovered as a “fruit” o f his confession, free from confrontation with his 
prior statements and acts. The voluntariness o f the confession would, on 
this thesis, be totally irrelevant. We reject such an extravagant extension 
of the Constitution.130
128 None o f the aforementioned cases interpreting the public safety exception have been appealed to the 
Supreme Court. Therefore, they are persuasive for the proposition that the exception is being expanded in 
various jurisdictions across the nation, and are mandatory authority in those states where the cases 
originated.
129 Harris v. New York. 401 U.S. 222, 2 2 6 (1971)
130 Id.
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Second, in Oregon v. Elstad. 470 U.S. 298, 299 (1985), it was held that a
Miranda-defective confession can nevertheless be “rehabilitated"’ by a subsequent
Mirandized confession. This seems appropriate, as the impermissibly obtained statement
still does not come into the trial: only the properly warned statement:
It is an unwarranted extension o f Miranda to hold that a simple failure to 
administer the warnings, unaccompanied by any actual coercion or other 
circumstances calculated to undermine the suspect's ability to exercise his 
free will, so taints the investigatory process that a subsequent voluntary 
and informed waiver is ineffective for some indeterminate period.131
The public safety exception requires no subsequent attempt by the defendant to benefit
from the Miranda violation. In Quarles, the defendant was tackled by police officers,
handcuffed, then immediately questioned without the Miranda warnings. His responses
were deemed admissible not based on some action by the defendant, but simply because
o f the Court’s concern that in some hypothetical emergency situation a police officer
might spend precious time thinking about whether he should protect society or
acknowledge and respect a suspect’s Fifth Amendment rights.
Clearly, both in Quarles and in subsequent opinions, the Court has been conscious
o f the sometimes inequitable result reached by strict application o f the Miranda rule. This
is clear through an examination o f the exceptions themselves, which are based on more
than a simple calculus o f  whether the defendant’s chances for an acquittal increase or
diminish; not so with Quarles. As Quarles noted, “when the primary social cost o f those
added protections is the possibility o f fewer convictions, the Miranda majority was
131 Id.
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willing to bear that cost.” 132 In Quarles, it was apparently not so willing. Nowhere in the 
Miranda opinion did the Court state any exceptions to its rule based on the physical 
safety o f  others. In fact, that innocent people may be put at risk has never been o f 
importance to the court when considering the usefulness o f  a constitutional rule.
The Quarles Court merely asserted that “[t]he doctrinal underpinnings o f Miranda 
do not require that it be applied in all its rigor to a situation in which police officers ask 
questions reasonably prompted by a concern for the public safety.”133 However, it does 
not logically follow, nor does fairness dictate, that the good intentions o f police officers 
may provide an exception to the otherwise “bright-line” rule o f Miranda.134 The Miranda 
majority certainly did not suggest such an exception. As discussed earlier, Quarles 
focused only on its concern that police officers, when confronted with an emergency, 
would waste valuable time wondering whether they should ignore Miranda when 
questioning suspects, or apply Miranda and risk losing information that may save lives.
This is a novel argument for this Court to make; after all, it is the same tribunal 
that created Miranda after reviewing police textbooks that offered and encouraged non­
violent methods for eliciting confessions from suspects.135 It also felt that those methods 
were “created for no purpose other than to subjugate the individual to the will o f his 
examiner,” 136 and that while not a physical assault, such methods were “equally
132 467 U.S. at 657.
133 Id  at 650.
134 The “good faith” o f  law enforcement has never been a permissible exception to the requirements o f  
Miranda.
135 See Miranda. 384 U.S. at 448-49.
136 Id  at 457.
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destructive o f human dignity.” 137 The Court believed that its rule would not hamper law 
enforcement’s efforts to fight crime. Thirty years later, the courts o f this country suppress 
statements every day due to a technical violation o f this Court’s rule, a rule which was 
created with full awareness o f the potential implications. The police officer who arrested 
Quarles interrogated him without any o f the Miranda warnings and demanded that he 
divulge the location o f  his gun. Quarles’ response was admitted against him in court 
because the safety o f the public was paramount, despite the blatant disregard for Miranda. 
The only difference between Quarles and Dickerson is the type and temporal immediacy 
o f the danger. In both events, the questioning began after the defendant had been 
subdued, leaving only a speculative, potential danger: in once case, a hidden gun in a 
grocery store and in the other, an unidentified and un-apprehended armed bank robber. In 
fact, if  one considers the seriousness o f  the public safety emergency, it is equally 
compelling to argue that Quarles’ statement should have been suppressed, but in 
Dickerson a public safety exception should have been allowed.
In these post-Miranda cases, and indeed in Miranda itself, the facts are subject to 
so much interpretation that it becomes no more than a random distinction that may set 
two cases apart. A further observation can also be made: as found in comparing the 
results reached in Quarles and Dickerson, sometimes the application o f  the Miranda rule 
leads to the admission o f  evidence in one case that may be considered violative o f 
Miranda or even the Fifth Amendment, yet in another, evidence could be suppressed 
where there is seemingly no constitutional harm at all to the defendant.
137 Id.
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In Quarles, the defendant was in custody and the gun was hidden in a store with 
several police officers in control o f the scene. There was no pressing reason to violate 
Miranda. In Dickerson, two suspects had been robbing banks. Detectives found one 
suspect, Dickerson, but knew there was another still at large. The police questioned 
Dickerson and learned the identity o f the codefendant, Rochester. If  the location o f a gun 
in Quarles was so important as to justify an exception to Miranda, why not the location o f 
an armed and dangerous man who had been actively robbing banks and was at large in 
the community?138 The police in Quarles could easily have cleared the store o f  citizens 
and found the weapon. In Dickerson, however, the un-apprehended suspect may have 
continued to rob banks or commit even more serious crimes. If the concern is public 
safety, securing Rochester was far more important than finding a hidden gun in a grocery 
store filled with police officers.
The Court felt police officers would be able to use their instincts in applying its 
rule, viz., they would “instinctively” know when they could ignore the Miranda warnings. 
The Court must have also assumed the police would know how far they could go in 
applying this instinct. In fact, the Court thought it would be able to avoid “post hoc 
findings at a suppression hearing concerning the subjective motivation o f the arresting 
officer,” such was its faith in these officers, despite the fact that the purpose for creating 
the rule in the first place was to insulate suspects from the coercive environment o f the 
interrogation room, which the Miranda majority believed was “destructive o f  human
1,8 Rochester later admitted to robbing 18 banks and an armored car. Dickerson v. United States. 166 F.3d 
667, 674 (1999)(U.S. Ct. App. 4,h).
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dignity.”139 A more suitable argument must be proffered to justify the result in Quarles: 
one that will provide both guidance for police officers in the field and for prosecutors in 
the court room.
The logical error in Quarles was made in moving from the incident140 to the 
admission o f the statement in court and letting the circumstances o f  the former justify the 
latter.141 This is improper for several reasons. First, the facts and circumstances o f any 
given case must be irrelevant when considering the admissibility o f a statement by the 
Court’s own argument. If  the reason for disallowing a suspect’s response to questioning 
is that the goal o f the questioning was merely to secure a conviction, then how can some 
questions asked in violation o f Miranda be allowed when their very admission in court is 
for no other reason but to secure a conviction! The only logical outcome the Quarles 
Court could have reached in starting with the facts and moving to the courtroom would 
be to commend the officer for protecting the innocent patrons o f the supermarket from 
danger by securing the weapon as quickly as possible, then suppressing the inculpatory 
statement. The Supreme Court o f New York suppressed the statement, as well as the 
appellate division and New York Court o f Appeals. There is no satisfactory reason by the 
Court’s own argument for allowing Quarles’ statement to be later admitted into evidence
• 142in court.
139 Id  at 457.
140 The incident here can represent the crime itself, a statement or confession made during or after the 
crime, or a later statement made during an investigation.
141 The proper analysis will be submitted toward the close o f  this thesis.
142 The Court offered the following justification: “We decline toplace officers . . .  in the untenable position 
o f  having to consider. . .  whether it best serves society for them to ask the necessary questions without the 
Miranda warnings and render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for them togive 
the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility o f  evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or
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Next, by letting case-specific facts justify their later admission in court, Miranda 
doctrine becomes nothing more than a re-invented totality o f the circumstances test. 
Recall the earlier comparison o f  the facts in Quarles and Dickerson. The facts in either 
case lent themselves equally well to admission or exclusion under the public safety 
doctrine. It could depend on the artfulness o f  the prosecutor or defense, or the disposition 
o f  the judge. Without a concrete method for determining the admissibility o f a 
confession, Miranda is no bright-line rule: with its host o f  exceptions, especially the 
public safety exception, it suffers from the same criticism lodged against the old totality 
o f  the circumstances test: it is insufficient for determining in any given case whether a 
suspect’s Fifth Amendment guarantee not to incriminate him self has been adequately 
safeguarded. It is no more reliable than the test prescribed by § 3501, which at least offers 
specific factors for a judge to consider in determining the admissibility o f  a confession. 
Under Miranda and the public safety exception, that decision is left to the police officer 
on the street.
Finally, if  the Court draws an imaginary distinction between un-Mirandized 
questioning for the purpose o f  protecting the public and un-Mirandized questioning for 
the purpose o f  acquiring testimonial evidence, how much freedom did the Court intend to 
give to these police officers acting on their judicially acknowledged and supported 
“ instinct?” W hat if  the police officer in Quarles tackled the suspect and beat him until he
destroy their ability to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting them.” 467 U.S. 
at 657-58. It is a classic bootstrapping argument: some questions asked by police officers are intended to 
build a case against the suspect and others merely to “protect society” or the officer himself. The court does 
not explain the difference in these questions, relying instead on thepolice, who will “instinctively” know 
the difference. O f course the court reserves the power to decide after the fact, with the benefit o f  hindsight, 
whether it feels that the officer’s instincts were correct.
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confessed to where he hid the weapon? The goal o f public safety, as cited in Quarles.
would be satisfied regardless o f the treatment o f  the suspect. And to what extent should
this exception be allowed? Justice Marshall, dissenting in Quarles, offers a perfect
example o f the possible limits to police action, involving the imminent explosion o f  a
bomb. Justice Marshall stated:
[T]he police are free to interrogate suspects without advising them o f their 
constitutional rights. Such unconsented questioning may take place not 
only when police officers act on instinct but also when higher faculties 
lead them to believe that advising a suspect o f his constitutional rights 
might decrease the likelihood that the suspect would reveal life-saving 
information. . . . While the Fourteenth Amendment sets limits on such 
behavior, nothing in the Fifth Amendment or our decision in Miranda v.
Arizona proscribes this sort o f emergency questioning. All the Fifth 
Amendment forbids is the introduction o f  coerced statements at trial.143
It seems, then, virtually the entire Court in Quarles144 believed that police officers, 
depending on the circumstances, may interrogate a suspect without the Miranda 
warnings. The only difference in the majority and dissenting opinions was whether the 
suspect’s answers could later be deemed admissible in court. The same objection remains 
here. In an emergency such as the impending explosion o f  a bomb, how far would the 
police be allowed to go? A slap in the face to encourage the suspect to reveal the hiding 
place o f the bomb? A punch in the jaw? What o f breaking an arm? A gunshot to the 
knee? The rationale behind police officers interrogating a suspect under the dissent’s 
example is the safety o f  the public. The Court disagreed as to whether the information
143 Id. at 686. Note that while the Fourteenth Amendment would cast an unfavorable eye upon a confession  
beaten out o f  a suspect, even if  in the interest o f  public safety, police officers would still be in a position 
where they are forced to decide between violating a constitutional right o f  a suspectand possibly saving 
lives, and would hopefully choose the latter.
144 With the exception o f  Justice O’Connor.
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could later be used against the suspect in court, yet all the Justices approved o f  the 
questioning without Miranda, such was its concern for the innocent people in the path o f 
the bomb. This is not further developed in the Court’s opinion.14^  More importantly, the 
Court would no doubt refrain from suggesting that there are circumstances where it 
would encourage police officers to disregard the Fourteenth Amendment, even if  the 
suspect admitted planting a bomb and informed the authorities that it would explode in a 
public place, killing many innocent people.146
The application o f  violence to obtain incriminatory statements is a classic 
example o f  coercion, or an involuntary confession, offensive to the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Such a confession is inadmissible for any reason; indeed this has been a 
long-accepted and fundamental aspect o f our jurisprudence. By the Quarles Court’s 
analysis, however, this becomes an irrelevant distinction. If  public safety is the concern, 
then police officers on the street will not only disregard Miranda, but tread on the 
Fourteenth Amendment, especially when such a distinction is blurred by concern for the 
safety o f others. The premises behind disallowing a truly involuntary confession is that, 
first, it is without sufficient indicia o f reliability, and second, to discourage the type o f
145 This is probably due to the fact that it would be bad form to encourage police officers to physically 
torture a suspect into revealing the location o f  a bomb, regardless o f  the fact that in certain cases to not do 
so would cost lives.
146 Fourth Amendment doctrine has not been so restrained in its consideration o f the application o f  physical 
force to obtain evidence. For example, in Sanders v. State. 247 Ga. App. 170(2000), a police officer 
suspected the defendant had crack cocaine hidden in his mouth. The officer grabbed the defendant around 
his neck and squeezed, preventing the defendant from swallowing. The Georgia Court o f  Appeals 
determined this was not an unreasonable search and seizure. See also Beck v. State. 216 Ga. App. 
532(1995)(Under similar circumstances, the court approved o f a police officer spraying the suspect in the 
face with pepper spray); Merriweather v. State. 228 Ga. App. 246 (1997)(Police officer justified in 
performing Heimlich maneuver on suspect who swallowed crack cocaine).
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abusive tactics the Miranda court cited and feared would continue to be implemented by 
the police.
As for the first premise, if this involuntary statement is found to be reliable; in 
other words, after the beating, the suspect revealed the location o f the gun and it was 
actually recovered, or the bomb found in its hiding place after the suspect is beaten into 
submission, then the coercive and physically abusive questioning conducted by the police 
led to a result lauded in Quarles as acceptable because it lessened the risk o f  harm to 
innocent bystanders, no matter that the suspect was injured, even hospitalized, and no 
matter that the statement violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
As for the second premise, that the Court wished to discourage the abusive tactics 
previously utilized by some police officers, this goal is directly subverted by the Court’s 
justification for its holding in Quarles. Quarles essentially holds that there are times when 
police coercion is to be applauded no matter the possible, albeit incidental, constitutional 
violations against the suspect. Put more succinctly, M iranda is based on the fear that 
some suspects will be tricked or scared or forced into making incriminating statements to 
the police: Miranda was a method by which the Court could ensure that questioning by 
the police did not cross a judicially created line or “safety zone.” With Quarles, however, 
the Court drew an exception to Miranda which not only permits the questioning o f  a 
suspect without the M iranda warnings being recited, but accedes to behavior which 
ignores Miranda’s barrier and approaches true constitutional trespasses. Thus, Quarles 
may promote the very behavior for which the Miranda rule had been created in the first 
place!
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The reasoning behind this second premise is obvious. If the purpose for allowing 
the unwarned statement into evidence in Quarles was that police officers should not have 
to decide whether the safety o f others is more important than securing incriminating 
evidence, then that purpose is met even in the case o f an involuntary confession. O f 
course, the Quarles Court maintained that its opinion did not affect the admission o f an 
involuntary statement, for, “[a]s the Miranda Court itself recognized, the failure to 
provide Miranda warnings in and o f itself does not render a confession involuntary, 
Miranda v. Arizona. 384 U.S. at 457, and respondent is certainly free on remand to argue 
that his statement was coerced under traditional due process standards.” 14 The entire 
issue may become merely a hair-splitting constitutional discussion: both the police officer 
in the bomb example and the police officer in Quarles detained a suspect and demanded 
the location o f the weapon for the purpose o f “protecting the public,” and in violation o f 
Miranda. The only difference is that the former officer beat the suspect until he 
confessed. The justification given in Quarles might support either scenario despite the 
Court’s insistence to the contrary, because the officer’s interest is in protecting the public 
from imminent danger. Alternatively, even assuming a coerced confession is suppressed 
as violative o f the Fourteenth Amendment, the analysis in Quarles shows that the Court 
nevertheless would acquiesce to such police behavior if  it involved a threat to public 
safety.
Thus, the analysis in Quarles is based on a distinction without a difference. The 
Court has lauded two major concepts in our society: the preservation o f individual rights
147 The dissent disagreed. “The "public-safety" exception is efficacious precisely because it permits police
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and the safety o f the public and society at large. These concepts have been introduced in 
varying degrees against the historical backdrop o f traditional Fifth Amendment 
jurisprudence.148 Over the years the Court has experimented by balancing the two 
concepts, trying to find a proper combination. In Miranda, the focus was primarily the 
protection o f  individual rights, with nary a thought given to the interests o f public 
safety.144 In Quarles and its progeny, however, the Court returned its focus to the safety 
o f the public. If  Quarles should be interpreted, as it must, to stand for the proposition that 
a confession will be admissible in court as long as it is voluntary and obtained in 
violation o f  Miranda during an “emergency situation,” then the risk cited in Miranda, that 
the baby will be tossed with the bath water, presents itself, for the risk is that a confession 
may be admitted that impinges on the Fifth Amendment. So Miranda, when considered 
with all o f  its exceptions, becomes a rule no more protective o f one’s rights than either § 
3501 or a simple voluntariness test.
To continue with the same examples, a suspect tackled, handcuffed and 
surrounded by police officers, then immediately interrogated by the arresting officer as to 
the location o f  a firearm, would face the admission o f his response in court. Certainly the 
suspect has a strong argument that his response was coerced, yet the Quarles Court 
disagreed. However, if  instead o f  interrogating the suspect while on the ground in
officers to coerce criminal defendants into making involuntary statements.’’Id. at 660.
148 Classically, there is no dispute that there have been no exceptions to suppression in the case o f  an 
involuntary confession; it cannot be used as impeachment evidence or for any other reason. Further, 
Miranda’s public safety exception may allow confessions that come dangerously close to coercion, while 
an ordinary Miranda situation would suppress a clearly un-coerced and quite voluntary confession.
149 The Court did not address the issue but for its stated belief that “[t]he limits we have placed on the 
interrogation process should not constitute an undue interference with a proper system o f  law 
enforcement.” Miranda. 384 U.S. at 481.
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handcuffs, the police officer walked him to a more quiet room, offered him a drink and a 
chair and patiently questioned him about the firearm’s location, without reading the 
Miranda warnings, as occurred in Dickerson. Miranda must disallow his response.
Over the years, the Court’s priorities again shifted, for Dickerson hearkens back 
to Miranda, and is the opinion o f a Court that has returned to the belief that the rights o f 
the individual are paramount. The Court must recognize that these two interests are each 
o f independent significance and each deserving o f some degree o f tribute. Quarles 
focused only on public safety, and Dickerson only on the individual. Miranda gave lip 
service to public safety, stating that its ruling “should not constitute an undue interference 
with a proper system o f law enforcement,” 150 but time has revealed its misapprehensions.
Quarles went largely unnoticed in the Miranda-Dickerson debate. It was not 
argued on appeal by the Department o f  Justice in Dickerson, nor was it discussed in the 
Court’s final opinion. It is unfortunate that the opinion was not explored.
B. OUR PARADIGM OF JURISPRUDENCE AND 
THE ANOMALY OF MIRANDA
No matter the measuring stick by which a legal system is weighed, such a system
must make sense. Miranda as currently understood no longer fits the paradigm o f modern
American jurisprudence Thomas S. Kuhn described it perfectly for the scientific world,
and his argument rings true here as well:
Discovery commences with the awareness o f anomaly, i.e. with the 
recognition that nature has somehow violated the paradigm-induced 
expectations that govern normal science. It then continues with a more or
150 Id.
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less extended exploration o f the area o f  anomaly. And it closes only when 
the paradigm theory has been adjusted so that the anomalous has become 
the expected.151
Our belief in and support o f  the Constitution and all its interpretations as a correct 
aggregate description o f human rights in America is just such a paradigm. When 
irregularities were recognized over the years, the paradigm shifted to accommodate
Ithem. In this case, the Supreme Court’s Miranda jurisprudence is the lawyer’s attempt 
to describe and explain part o f  this paradigm, part o f our Constitution. While the Court’s 
voluntariness jurisprudence has always been accepted as appropriate and sensible without 
too much friction, Miranda was no such animal. “Miranda has been continually criticized 
by lawyers, law enforcement officials, and scholars since its pronouncement.” 153 
Certainly Miranda possessed some degree o f  utility in addressing judicially perceived 
notions o f police misconduct, but as the rule was applied to varying facts, it proved to be 
a rule requiring the constant creation o f exceptions to avoid inequitable results. With the 
advent of the exception recognized in Quarles, the stiffly supported rule in Miranda has 
become so compromised that it has become dangerous. Despite the Court’s insistence to 
the contrary, Miranda no longer fits properly in our paradigm.
Dickerson cites as one o f the main reasons for M iranda’s continued existence the 
fact that it has “become embedded in routine police practice to the point where the 
warnings have become part o f  our national culture.” 154 This argument is not adequately
151 Kuhn, Thomas S. The Structure o f  Scientific Revolutions. 3rd ed. Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 
1996.
152 Some obvious examples include the constitutional amendments establishing women’s suffrage and 
abolishing slavery.
153 Dickerson. 120 S.Ct. at 2347.
154 Dickerson. 120 S.Ct. at 2336.
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supported. First, if Miranda has indeed become part o f our national culture, then it is 
primarily attributable to television and the media, as was suggested in the dissent.155 The 
media often portrays interrogations as conducted in darkened rooms, with violent 
physical assaults, threats and lengthy periods o f incommunicado confinement. These 
examples o f our “national culture” are not representative o f modem police practices. 
Second, the media portrays Miranda as something that must be recited the moment 
anyone is arrested, whether or not questioning ensues. This is not the law. There are 
really only two alternative conclusions to be made. First, because society gets such an 
unrealistic and inaccurate description o f what Miranda really is, it cannot be said that 
Miranda as a legal doctrine is really part o f  our national culture. The fact that society 
believes that one must be “read his rights” the moment he is arrested does not mean either 
that it must be so or that the law must adapt itself to conform to this interpretation. What 
has become part o f our national culture is an idealized and romanticized media vision o f 
Miranda, and one which is likely to prove disappointing to a suspect expecting their 
rights to be read to them the moment they are placed in handcuffs. In the alternative, if  
the reason for preserving Miranda is that everyone is already familiar with the warnings, 
then there is no longer a reason to inform someone o f those rights. It becomes merely a 
formality that serves no purpose but to create a possible avenue for suppression and 
subsequent acquittal.
Our constitutional paradigm still attempts to recognize Miranda as a valid 
description o f the Fifth Amendment, viz., it is still intended to be o f significance when we
155 Id. at 2347.
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say one’s confession was elicited in violation o f the Miranda rule. The problem is that 
Miranda no longer describes our understanding of the Constitution, and it is based on 
what is no longer a proper description o f police techniques. It has become mere 
sacrament; something we do that is no longer o f operative significance.
This said, it is not proposed here that Miranda be overruled. Miranda does still 
occasionally function to prevent the use in court o f  a confession or incriminating 
statement extracted nearly in violation o f the Fifth Amendment. It is also effective when 
a police officer avoids reading a suspect his warnings when no danger to others is 
cognizable, or after a display o f hostility or menacing non-physical behavior directed at 
the police officer . Certainly Miranda has utility under these circumstances. To declare 
that Miranda should be discarded now would be difficult, especially in light o f the 
Court’s recent endorsement. To support M iranda’s destruction would be problematic for 
several more reasons. First, unlike science, the law cannot be forced to adapt and change: 
statutes remain in force long after their time for usefulness has past. Judges apply the law 
even while commenting that the law or rule being enforced must be erased by the 
legislature. Instead o f  addressing changes that are needed in the law, legislators introduce 
irrelevant or unnecessary bills for political purposes. Even if  the public at large or the 
legal community were all convinced that Miranda is an anachronism, it is a far cry from 
convincing the Court to overrule the opinion now, or legislatively overriding it in 
Congress. On a related matter, such an extreme solution or suggestion in the face o f the 
Court’s fresh re-evaluation o f Miranda would have no effect on the legal community; at 
best it would be merely another complaint, another unremarkable criticism to be lodged
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against the Court. Instead, the hope is that the ideas set forth here provide a present 
alternative to the result sometimes reached with Miranda, without calling for M iranda’s 
complete extinction and without defying the Court’s ruling in Dickerson. As already 
conceded, there are occasions when Miranda does solve the problem it was designed to 
address. But it is hoped that the reader examines Quarles more closely, and attempts to 
apply it in any case where the police can articulate some concern for the public, some 
danger to innocent parties. In Dickerson, the public safety exception should have been 
applied; at least it should have been argued. The FBI knew that the accomplice, 
Rochester, was at large and dangerous. He had robbed at eighteen banks. He was armed. 
He had avoided capture and may have known that Dickerson was in the custody o f  law 
enforcement. Every minute the FBI waited was more opportunity for him to distance 
himself from Dickerson and the FBI. Dickerson was questioned under circumstances that 
did not even approach the realm o f coercion. The only thing at issue was whether his 
Miranda warnings were read to him before or after he confessed. Under these 
circumstances, a public safety exception should have been applied.156
It is difficult to outline the parameters o f  such a development o f the public safety 
doctrine. It is, and has always been a fact-sensitive exception that the Court has been 
careful to apply. The important distinction, however, is that the Court look beyond the 
event in question and consider the entire situation as understood by the police officer. In 
other words, instead o f looking only at the interrogation o f Dickerson, the Court should
156 If the concern is that such an expanding o f  the public safety exception would swallow the rule in 
Miranda, one possible solution would be to only expand the exception under circumstances where without 
such an expansion the state would have no case whatsoever.
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consider the entire contemporaneous set o f  circumstances, which would include the FBI’s 
need to identify and arrest the co-defendant, Rochester, who was armed, dangerous and 
free.
One possible criticism to this approach is that the public safety exception 
recognized under M iranda, were it to be expanded at all, would completely undermine 
Miranda, i.e., Quarles would allow, but for due process analysis, the admission o f  
involuntary statements that are, nevertheless, in compliance with Miranda. The Dickerson 
Court felt Miranda was necessary to protect “precious 5lh Amendment guarantees,” 157 yet 
the warnings themselves may allow confessions that are violative o f the very rights they 
were designed to protect. It is the Fifth Amendment which “protects one’s precious 5th 
Amendment guarantees.” 158 Miranda is merely the pathway leading to the home. “The 
requirement that Miranda warnings be given does not, o f course, dispense with the 
voluntariness inquiry.” 159 Thus, Miranda does not save the courts any time in determining 
whether one’s confession was elicited under coercion or duress. Nor does the rule ensure 
that police officers respect one's Fifth amendment guarantees; after all, Miranda can be 
followed even though the Fifth Amendment is ignored. The Dickerson Court admitted 
this much.160
To implement the public safety exception, one merely need re-examine Quarles. 
As already asserted, the error in Quarles was letting the circumstances o f  the police- 
extracted confession justify its later admission in court. The more proper approach is the
157 Dickerson. 120 S.Ct. at 2340.
158 Id-
159 Jd at 2336.
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exact opposite. A more clear and succinct rule will emerge if the Court considers the 
desired result first. This is the same procedure by which Miranda itself was intended to be 
applied. The goal was the protection o f those rights addressed by the Fifth Amendment 
Miranda was forward looking, requiring the warnings in every custodial questioning 
situation, not merely those that occurred in certain places or under certain circumstances. 
In Quarles, the Court balanced the protection o f  society from harm as weighed against the 
protection o f an individual’s constitutional rights and decided that the safety o f society 
was paramount. Perhaps it is an over-generalization o f  the opinion, but even in a more 
narrow sense, viz., that the safety o f society is more important than one’s right not to be 
compelled to incriminate himself, the same principle obtains. Having established this 
general principle, the Court felt the safety o f  society would be compromised if police 
officers had to consider whether it was more important to violate Miranda to keep others 
from danger, or to follow Miranda and risk the safety o f  others. This should be the 
starting point for the Court. From that point the application o f the facts to the desired 
result should be more proper161.
Dickerson discarded § 3501 because the Miranda Court “noted that reliance on 
the traditional totality-of-the-circumstances test raised a risk o f  overlooking an 
involuntary custodial confession.”162 Yet over the decades Miranda has become such a 
patchwork conglomeration of exceptions that it has become a totality o f the
161 It does not obtain to argue that the goal in Quarles was to prevent one from giving up 
his Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment right not to be coerced into confessing to a crime. As 
already argued and accepted by the Dickerson Court, the application o f Miranda does not 
necessarily insure that a confession is voluntary, although it is conceded that such a case 
would be rare. 120 S.Ct. at 2336.
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circumstances test itself. It began as a mandate simple enough to apply and enforce: if  the
warnings were not given, the statement would not be admitted. Over the decades many
exceptions have been created, to the point where even a blatant disregard for the Miranda
warnings was deemed acceptable163. Like any judicial exception to a rule, it was made to
create and further define the rule it modifies so that it will weather time and progress and
keep close the interests o f  justice and fairness. To do otherwise would cause Miranda to
become a stale and useless edict with no foundation in logic or justice. The Court has
essentially placed Miranda on a “continuum o f harm,” drawing the line where the Court
felt the risk to others was imminent. Since Quarles, the Court has instituted a de facto
totality o f  the circumstances rule, where despite the clear violation o f Miranda, the Court
refused to apply it because it determined the danger too great, the potential for future
injury too palpable.
We decline to place officers . . .  in the untenable position o f having to 
consider, often in a matter o f  seconds, whether it best serves society for 
them to ask the necessary questions without the Miranda warnings and 
render whatever probative evidence they uncover inadmissible, or for 
them to give the warnings in order to preserve the admissibility o f 
evidence they might uncover but possibly damage or destroy their ability 
to obtain that evidence and neutralize the volatile situation confronting 
them .164
This continuum paradigm is not an inappropriate method for applying Miranda. 
Quarles has already established the proper dividing line between admission and 
suppression: the clear potential danger to others. What remains is to look backward and
162 Id  at 2335(citing Miranda. 384 U.S. at 457).
163 Quarles
164 New York v. Quarles. 467 U.S. 649, 657-58(1984).
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decide where on the line any given factual scenario would fall. Both the Dickerson and 
Miranda Courts feared that a totality o f the circumstances approach was not as effective a 
system to protect one’s constitutional rights as the rule instilled by Miranda. But the 
proposal offered here is no more a totality o f the circumstances test than Miranda is 
already. Recognizing this continuum approach may lead to a rule that applies Miranda 
but recognizes the potential for absurd results and prevents such an outcome. This 
continuum may stand for the balancing required between individual rights and the 
collective rights o f the people to be safe from harm, a balance that must be preserved, as 
it is a cornerstone o f our jurisprudence.
C. THE CONTINUUM AND THE CONCLUSION
The totality test feared by the Dickerson Court was that of reviewing the 
circumstances in each case and basing its decision to suppress or admit on specific case- 
sensitive facts. This is quite different from the rule proposed here. The proposal, as 
illustrated in Figure 1, is that the Court draw two lines in the sand: the first at the point 
where a confession becomes involuntary under well-settled Fifth Amendment and 
Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence, and the second at the point where there is an 
articulable harm to others. Any confession falling between these two lines should be 
deemed admissible. Anything exceeding constitutionally sound voluntariness cannot be 
allowed; nor can Miranda be completely ignored in allowing an unwarned confession 
when there is no reckonable danger to others. The balancing here is between the
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individual rights o f the defendant and the risk to society. If a police officer employs 
coercive tactics to neutralize a threat to others, for example, both goals can be satisfied: 
the threat is neutralized and the defendant’s coerced confession can be suppressed.165 If 
Miranda is violated but the risk o f  harm to others speculative or so far removed as to be 
irrelevant, then the standard rule may be applied and the confession suppressed. This is a 
more appropriate application o f Miranda and a more stable explanation for the situation 
presented in Quarles.
FIGURE 1. “ The C ontinuum  of C oercion”
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In the earlier example o f the wife murdering her husband, this proposal would 
likely be ineffective. But by applying this “continuum o f coercion,” the trial judge could 
have ruled that there was a technical violation o f Miranda but that it was, nevertheless, a
165 This obtains regardless o f  the Court’s discomfort for such a fact.
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voluntary confession, and that the public safety interest in finding the accomplice, 
Rochester, justified the FBI’s questioning o f Dickerson and the subsequent admission o f 
his confession in court.
The potential for abuse is no doubt looming in the mind o f the reader. However, the 
potential for abuse in Quarles is already present. Quarles has instituted an imprecise and 
subjective test for officers in the field to apply, and trusted their instincts to know when it 
was appropriate to ignore Miranda.166 The judiciary is the body that is best designed for 
such decisions, and should be the group to shoulder the burden o f determining when a 
confession is to be admitted. As such, by accepting this continuum approach police 
officers will be able to leam and apply one simple rule instead o f the patchwork quilt 
known as Miranda.
Today, if  a police officer violates Miranda because o f an immediate and obvious 
danger, then the court should apply the public safety exception. The only reason one even 
contemplates an exception to Miranda under such circumstances is to avert a potential 
threat precipitated by a suspect, or a future threat should a defendant be set free. That is 
why the public safety exception, as described in Quarles and applied today, is simply not 
enough.
The true goal in the conduct and questioning o f  a police officer, from the street to 
the courtroom, is to keep the streets safe. That goal includes asking a suspect with a 
history o f sexual assaults whether he raped a specific person or asking a person in 
custody where a gun is located without reciting Miranda, and in eliciting a confession
166 Quarles. 467 U.S. at 659.
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from a suspect who, along with another suspect, had been participating in the armed 
robbery o f numerous banks across several states and will continue to do so if  not stopped. 
The rapist will keep raping and the bank robber will keep robbing, constituting clear 
future threats, and the gun hidden by the suspect is a present threat. The desired objective, 
whatever the case, is the safety and protection o f the people.
Furthermore, defendants in criminal cases are not the only participants in the 
criminal justice system that are entitled to the protection guaranteed by the Constitution. 
Under Miranda today, some defendants will go free because a police officer forgot to 
inform a suspect that i f  she cannot afford an attorney, one will be given her at no cost. 
Such is not a violation o f  the Constitution,167 and a person should not go with his 
victimization unpunished because o f such a minor trespass.
This thesis is not meant to stand Miranda on its head. It is a proffer narrow in 
scope: simply put, i f  the prosecution’s case includes the voluntary statement or 
confession o f a defendant that was elicited in technical violation o f Miranda and under 
circumstances where it can be argued by the government that public safety required such 
questioning,168 then the Court should not immediately suppress such a statement and 
release a criminal to the streets. Quarles already allows the introduction o f such 
statements. This thesis merely illustrates that the judicial gloss placed on the “public 
safety exception” is far too restrictive. In Dickerson, such an exception should have been 
recognized and applied. That the FBI failed to mirandize Dickerson before questioning
167 “Justices whose votes are needed to compose today's majority are on record as believing that a violation 
o f  Miranda is not a violation o f  the Constitution.” Dickerson. 120 S.Ct. at 2337.
168 See the continuum o f  coercion, Figure 1.
him is unfortunate; that such failure should result in Dickerson’s acquittal 
deplorable.169 It is time for a better solution.
169 To date, Dickerson has not been re-tried on these charges. He remains a free man.
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